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Everthing not saved will be lost
Abstract
In this thesis I examine the welfare and social consequences associated
with one economic shock and two policy interventions in Mexico. I use
non-experimental approaches that exploit increased data availability as
well as in-depth knowledge of the institutional background and show
how germane extensions in the methodology shed light on previously
unaccounted consequences and help better identify affected households.
In particular, I quantify the role of quantity substitution effects in the
alleviation of welfare, I estimate the effect of quality substitution on the
efficiency of a taxation policy, and I document the possible consequences
of an aggressive policy intervention on organized and property crime.
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1Introduction
There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know.
There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we
know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There
are things we don’t know we don’t know.
–Donald Rumsfeld
1.1 General motivation
The identification and measurement of the ramifications of economic shocks and pol-
icy interventions are an important topic in Economics1 because of the considerable
welfare and social consequences associated with them.
Additionally to the immediate loss, economic shocks can have persistent and
pervasive long-term impacts through the compound responses of those affected. For
example, selling productive capital as a way of generating income in face of a shock
can hinder the engagement in productive activities in the future2. Coincidentally,
the reduced supply of goods can lead to price changes that can impact previously
unaffected individuals.
As opposed to a shock, a policy intervention is a guided course of action with
a specific aim. The changes elicited can have the desired behavioral effects, but
can likewise lead to unexpected outcomes. The existence of so-called “unintended
consequences” poses an additional challenge to the already intricate exercise of
formulating successful economic policies, especially if these consequences have a
1It was, for example, mentioned extensively in the World Development Report 2014 (World
Bank, 2014).
2For example, Dercon (2005) offers a summary of possible shocks, coping strategies, and
consequences of both.
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negative impact on the desired outcome3. However, their identification can lead
to a better understanding of both the economic and social relationships at play.
For example, taxing one good might lead to price increases in its close substitutes
and affect the welfare of individuals not initially targeted by the policy. Yet, this
development clarifies the preferences of the economic subjects and this insight can
prove useful in future policies.
Policy makers will be able to respond appropriately to negative or unwanted
welfare and social impacts if they can determine in time what the unintended
consequences, the affected economic subjects and the changes along the income (or
expenditure) distribution are. In each case, researchers will require nuanced and
precise information in order to ameliorate any downfalls or modify any policies to
achieve the desired efficacy and efficiency.
To obtain such granular information, welfare and social changes need to be
measured along the corresponding distribution while paying special attention to
relevant socioeconomic characteristics. Their choice has to be informed by in-depth
knowledge of the setting and the institutional background to which the policy was
introduced or the shock took place.
Yet, despite the need for detailed descriptions of the consequences and adap-
tation processes that occur in such cases, studies are often limited in the scope
of their analysis. This limitations can arise because of data unavailability that
impedes the inclusion of germane extensions to the methodology. This is more
salient for some topics, like law enforcement and crime, and more so in countries
where the necessary infrastructure for data gathering is still developing.
Furthermore, because economics is a social science, the study of casual relation-
ships in certain areas is complicated by the reliance on “natural experiments”, i.e.
the unexpected onset of changes in the economic environment4. Nevertheless, the
continuous digitization of information makes the analysis of topics that were difficult
to address in the past possible, as it allows for data gathering in unconventional
and non-experimental ways. One example, out of many, for analyses that use such
data are found in Baker et al. (2016) and Nomura et al. (2017). This type of data is
generally called “Big Data”. Although the definition is still vague, one component
is data acquired through web scrapping. In this method, internet searches for a
particular item are automated and the relevant data is extracted from the results.
While the opportunities and challenges of these data in Economics are still debated
(Einav and Levin, 2014), these data can be an useful extension to the conventional
ones.
Mexico provides an interesting study in the consequences of disruption, guided
3In their paper on arms races and conflict, Collier and Hoeﬄer (2007) define unintended
consequences as previously unaccounted negative externalities.
4Laboratory experiments are not always feasible or ethical.
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or not, in the economic landscape. It is a large transitioning country in an unique
position. Not only it is geographically and culturally positioned between the United
States of America and Latin America, it is also part of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which makes it susceptible to exogenously generated
price changes, particularly of food prices, as it is a net importer of these. It also faces
particular internal challenges. It is infamous for the presence of drug trafficking
organizations on its soil and the violence they entail; in the decade between 2006
and 2016 alone, around 7000 individuals a year lost their lives to drug-related
violence Shirk and Wallman (2015), for example. Moreover, it currently faces the
epidemiological and nutrition transitions and needs to prepare accordingly to their
fallout. The magnitude of the changes in health outcomes is exemplified in Rivera
et al. (2004). They report an increase in the national prevalence of obesity 160%
between 1988 and 1999.
While these three topics: food price changes, drug trafficking organizations
and the epidemiological and nutrition transition are, as presented here, singular to
Mexico, they are by no means unique.
Food prices spikes have affected the lives of many in developed and developing
countries as have the repercussions of badly targeted offsetting policies (Wood
et al., 2012; Ivanic and Martin, 2008; Akter and Basher, 2014; Ferreira et al., 2013;
Jacoby, 2013), countries at different stages of development struggle with violent
organized crime (Dorn et al., 2005; Draca and Machin, 2015; Bu¨ckner and Cic-
cone, 2010; Paloyo et al., 2010; Gaviria, 2000; Angrist and Kugler, 2008), and the
epidemiological and nutrition transitions have been a topic in countries such as the
United Kingdom and others (De Agostini, 2014; Popkin and Gordon-Larsen, 2004;
Popkin, 1993; Allais et al., 2010).
1.2 Thesis outline
In this thesis I use non-experimental approaches that exploit increased data avail-
ability as well as in-depth knowledge of the institutional background to analyze
the social and welfare impacts of shocks and policy interventions in Mexico. In
particular I pinpoint possible unintended consequences, identify affected households
and measure changes along the expenditure distribution.
1.2.1 Food price shock
Food price spikes have proven to be an increasingly challenging issue in the last 20
years (Swinnen and Squicciarini, 2012) rising concerns regarding food security (for
example, Harttgen and Klasen (2012)), poverty (for example, Wood et al. (2012);
Ivanic and Martin (2008); Campo et al. (2008); Vu and Glewwe (2011)), as well as
3
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welfare (for example, Ferreira et al. (2013); Jacoby (2013)) and governments are
quick to intervene in case food price changes threaten to destabilize the social and
economic life.
One such price hike started 2006 and called several governments into action. In
Vietnam the rises in the price of rice moved the government to prohibit exports of
this items until price stability could be achieved (Heady and Fan, 2008). In Mexico,
the price for the main staple, tortilla, doubled in less than 12 months and people
took to the streets (Dyer and Taylor, 2011). Governments and aid agencies were
eager to identify the “net-losers” to try and stop social and economic upheaval.
Although welfare and development economists are well aware of the processes such
shocks entail, in welfare analyses they have seldom included quantity substitution
effects.
In the case of Mexico, a country with a varied diet, the inclusion of such effects,
as well as accounting for changes in different types of income, provides a rich picture
of the welfare changes that take place. The results show that substitution away
from expensive food items serves as non-negligible coping strategy and that rural
households can be as affected by a price spike as non-rural ones, albeit the latter
ones are usually grouped into the “net-producers” of food who are expected to gain
from such a price increase (Deaton, 1987; Deaton, 1988; Deaton, 1990).
1.2.2 Kingpin strategy and property crime
A special type of government intervention that aims at curtailing a certain behav-
ior are armed interventions against organized crime (Caldero´n et al., 2015). In
particular, Mexico has been increasingly struggling with organized drug trafficking
organizations (DTO) in the last 20 years (Shirk and Wallman, 2015). While neither
organized crime nor drug trafficking organizations are new to Mexico, the scope
of their activities picked up after the Colombian Cartels started winding down
their activities in the mid 1990s5. While the literature is clear that one direct
consequence of the government intervention was to exacerbate the violent and
deadly altercations between and within cartels in Mexico and thus racking up
more than 60000 drug cartel related deaths in ten years, there is no literature that
addresses other possible unintended consequences.
I provide an initial documentation of the link between a government intervention
that disrupts the existing status quo of organized crime organizations and the effect
this can have on property crime that is not typically associated with them. I find
supportive evidence for a link between a violent intervention and the geographical
expansion of DTO as well as a possible link between the presence of these DTO and
5The reasons for this do not lie in any Mexican activities but mostly in interventions from the
Colombian government and fights between cartels for control Castillo et al. (2013).
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a decline in property crimes not directly related to the business of drug trafficking.
1.2.3 Soda tax
Intentional price hikes, for example due to an excise tax, need to be tested for their
explicit usefulness. Mexico introduced a tax on sugar-added beverages in January
2014 with the aim of curbing the consumption of this good that has been deemed
harmful (Powell et al., 2013; Malik et al., 2006), especially as the obesity rates in
Mexico have soared in the last 20 years (Rivera et al., 2002; Rivera et al., 2004).
The projections on the efficiency and efficacy of such a tax are based on price
elasticity estimates that do not take into account a possible substitution along the
quality margin (McKelvey, 2011; Andalon and Gibson, 2017). If quality substitution
is large enough, a tax to damper consumption will not efficient and it might not be
even effective. Although the issue of quality substitution has been mentioned in
the literature (for example, Ferreira et al. (2013) note that this can be a concern.)
and is handled implicitly, there is a lack of literature that does so explicitly.
Using large cross-sectional data as well as detailed price data from a secondary
source, I am able to determine the extent of the quality and quantity substitution.
I show that given the spread of the price bracket in soda, a tax on quantity will
lead to quality substitution large enough to almost offset the effect of the tax.
Furthermore, I present evidence that the tax affects the poor, who consume less
soda, overproportionally.
1.3 Contribution
The results show how combining different data sources and the methodological
extensions they allow, sheds light on previously unaccounted welfare and social
effects.
In particular, I show how quantity substitution effects in the wake of a price
increases help alleviate welfare losses to a larger extent than previously thought.
Similarly, quality substitution effects are prominent in goods with a large quality
margin, and they can diminish the efficiency and efficacy of a taxation policy
intended to decrease their consumption. Finally, aggressive policy interventions
aimed at reducing organized crime can have the negative unintended consequence
of increasing the geographical presence of those organizations and the subsequent
unintended consequence of reducing crime not related to them.
In each case I identify affected groups, be it households or geographical areas,
and measure the extend of the elicited distributional changes, be it direct or indirect
ones. When possible, I pay especial attention to the impacts on poorer households.
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The methodological extensions and the documented relationships in this thesis
offer multiple possibilities for future research: the inclusion of quality as well
as quantity substitution in future welfare analysis of price changes, the social
consequences the retreat of organized crime from an area can have on certain types
of crimes, and the possibility to limit quality substitution through other measures
when trying to curb the consumption of certain goods.
6
2Welfare effects of changed prices.
The “Tortilla Crisis” revisited
2.1 Introduction
In the last 20 years the incidence and scope of temporary food prices shocks around
the world has increased (Swinnen and Squicciarini, 2012; Wood et al., 2012; Hoyos
and Medvedev, 2009). Between 2008 and 2010 Mexico experienced two tremendous
increases of maize prices due to increased demand, population growth, low past
investment, geopolitical concerns, droughts in other parts of the world as well an
increased interest in biofuels (Wood et al., 2012; Baffes and Dennis, 2013; Piesse
and Thirtle, 2009; Robles and Torero, 2010; Dyer and Taylor, 2011). People took
the streets and protested against the governments’ inability to control the loss of
purchasing power, particularly among the urban poor1. But Mexico (and maize),
were not the only ones affected: world prices for milk powder, wheat and rice
increased substantially (Ivanic and Martin, 2008) and countries like Vietnam and
India tried to curb exports to ensure sufficient internal supply (Ferreira et al., 2013).
These price shocks raised policy concerns regarding poverty (Wood et al., 2012;
Ferreira et al., 2013; Ivanic and Martin, 2008) as well as food security (Swinnen
and Squicciarini, 2012; Cohen and Garrett, 2010; Harttgen and Klasen, 2012).
Theoretically, such price shocks have important distributional effects to which
governments may want to react through appropriate targeted interventions. Yet,
teasing out these distributional consequences in detail is far from straightforward
because price increases do not only affect the consumption side but also the income
side whenever households’ income directly or indirectly depends on the production
of these goods. Moreover, households can react to price changes by adjusting their
1For example: http://www.elmundo.es/mundodinero/2007/01/31/economia/1170261989.
html
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consumption, production and labor supply. Most of the existing literature ignores
the complexity of such price changes and focuses solely on the consumption side
and on first order effects, though there are some notable exceptions which will be
discussed below.
In this paper I use a series of cross-sectional household surveys with detailed
information about households’ consumption patterns and income sources by product
group in conjunction with detailed price data from 46 price stations distributed
all over Mexico to calculate the net welfare effects associated with observed price
shocks in general and food price changes in particular. Moreover, I decompose
these net effects into its various contributing factors. This is the first study that
analyses the welfare effects of food price inflation in Mexico in such detail and
hence provides valuable insights regarding the design and targeting of policies to
mitigate the distributional consequences of such shocks. In doing so, this paper
contributes to the methodological discussion on how to account for differential
inflation in welfare analyses.
A plethora of previous empirical studies have analyzed the distributional impact
of food price changes. Besides methodological differences2 these studies differ in
their scope. Furthermore, the welfare effects of price changes are most likely highly
context specific, depending on income and expenditure profiles in each country
(Harttgen and Klasen, 2012; Akter and Basher, 2014).
The focus of some studies is on simulating the effects on welfare of a price
change, for example because of a change in the taxation regime (Porto, 2006;
Porto, 2008) or by imputing price changes and simulating the response (Ivanic and
Martin, 2008; Hoyos and Medvedev, 2009; Vu and Glewwe, 2011). According to
Akter and Basher (2014), results obtained in this manner should be interpreted
carefully because they do not have data on, or ignore, adjustments in expenditures
and income of the households. This can lead to overestimating the effects of price
changes.
Other studies do not rely on simulation, but estimate only the first order expen-
diture effects, i.e. welfare effects that arise from unadjusted changes in expenditures.
The advantages of this approach are twofold: first, household expenditure data
is more readily available than income data and so the welfare assessment can be
performed shortly after the price increase (Friedman and Levinsohn, 2002) and
second, it is argued that a distinction between production and consumption is only
necessary if both react to different price signals. For example Deaton (1989) reasons
that Thai subsistence farmers posses large shares of auto-consumption in goods
with low added value, thus observing equal pricing for consumption and production.
Furthermore, urban households are not likely producers; income effects in this
2Araar and Verme (2016) and Janvry and Sadoulet (2009) offer an excellent summary on this
point.
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case are most likely minimal and can be ignored for certain purposes (Hoyos and
Medvedev, 2009). Nevertheless, these analyses are limited to a specific commodity
group or a small number of commodity groups and do not offer comprehensive
results.
Studies that include the adjustment of expenditures due to a change in prices,
i.e. the second order expenditure effect, also known as substitution effects, are,
for example, Robles and Torero (2010) for a set of four Latin American countries
and Friedman and Levinsohn (2002) for Indonesia. Both studies conclude that
the inclusion of substitution effects substantially influences the magnitude of the
estimated welfare change by accounting for the expenditure adjustments of the
households. Robles and Torero (2010) find that not including substitution effects
would overestimate the welfare loss induced by a price increase by 7 to 12 percent,
on average.
Finally, studies more akin to this are those that include first and second order
effects, both in income and in expenditures. Examples are Jacoby (2013) for India
and Ferreira et al. (2013) for Brazil3. Although these studies are limited to the
analysis of food prices, they find that including income responses provides more
differentiated welfare effects. Particularly, it appears that poor households seem to
benefit from the price increase.
Several studies have looked into the welfare effects of price changes in Mexico.
Valero-Gil and Valero (2008) concentrate on changes in consumption patterns due
to increases in prices of staples and find a moderate poverty rate increase. They also
identify certain food staples for which they argue price controls would achieve the
largest welfare effects. Porto (2008) proposes a methodology that includes responses
on the income and the expenditure sides. He simulates different price increase
scenarios and for each computes “consumption” and “income” effects. The first is a
compound of the first and second order responses in expenditure, the second refers
to agricultural wages. He finds that an income effect can ameliorate the (negative)
impact of a price increase but that this will depend on the size of the observed price
changes and the goods for which the price increases. Dyer and Taylor (2011) also
use a simulation to assess the effect of corn price increases on corn production and
the respective labor supply and conclude that even in rural areas, there are large
discrepancies in the distribution of gains and losses. Campo et al. (2008) simulate
three different price increases for two types of commodity groups: cereals and all
goods. They conclude that the expenditures of poor individuals, be it in rural
or non-rural areas, are hit harder by price increases than non-poor ones because
their food expenditure shares are relatively larger; thus food price increases have a
3Akter and Basher (2014) measure the effect on welfare of a price increase in Bangladesh and
its subsequent economic consequence. This approach is not comparable as they assume that the
economic response was not simultaneous
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negative poverty effect, i.e. they increase and exacerbate poverty. Nonetheless, the
authors also include the second order expenditure effect to account for substitution
and found that the rural poor in particular are able to offset a part of the negative
expenditure effect. In a further methodological step, Wood et al. (2012), found that
including an income effect, i.e. computing the compensating variation, in necessary
since the magnitude of the welfare effect changes significantly. According to their
simulation results, the inclusion of the first order expenditure effects overestimates
and that of second order expenditure effects, one that includes only the own-price
elasticities, underestimates the welfare change.
These studies typically rely on simulations, unit values (ratio of expenditures
for an item with respect to overall expenditures) instead of prices, or on a limited
set of goods to estimate welfare impacts. I estimate the compensating variation for
rural and non-rural households using official prices for food and non-food items as
well as including wage and non-wage income.
I find that most of the positive welfare changes observed stem from a positive
expenditure effect rooted in changes in the prices of non-food items. Furthermore,
in times of high food inflation, as was 2008− 2010 most of welfare losses can be
attributed to changes in food prices. Moreover, the inclusion of both the income as
well as the substitution effects considerably changes the magnitude of the welfare
change. Finally, while the welfare losses appear to be similar in both rural and
non-rural areas, the poverty impact in non-rural ones is larger.
2.2 Concept
I take the ““welfarist” approach” (Slesnick, 1998) to welfare here4: welfare is
obtained from the consumption of goods and services and is thus roughly defined as
the amount of money needed to sustain a given level of utility. Net welfare changes
are the product of changes in income and expenditures. A higher (lower) income
means gains (losses) in welfare and higher (lower) expenditures for a given utility
level mean losses (gains) in welfare. Hence, changes in prices can cause changes in
welfare by affecting both income and expenditures.
The size and direction of a change in expenditures due to a change in prices can
be broken down into the income and the substitution effects. The income effect
arises due to the changes in the purchasing power and the substitution effect due
to changes in the relative prices between goods.
For example, a consumer facing an increased price for beef may purchase less
beef than before (income effect). Simultaneously, and provided unchanged prices of
other goods, the price of chicken meat relative the price of beef will be lower and
4A different approach to welfare measurement is for example Sen’s capability approach.
10
2.2 Concept
the consumer may substitute beef with more chicken meat (substitution effect).
The magnitude of the substitution will depend on the individual, relative valuation
of each good. Hence, the empirical analysis of the substitution effect requires the
corresponding direct and cross price-elasticities.
Moreover, the magnitude of the welfare effect will depend on the size of the
relative expenditure share in total expenditures of the commodity in question.
Price changes of goods whose relative expenditure shares are relatively small will
have a comparatively small impact on welfare as opposed to price changes of goods
whose relative expenditure share is large.
Changes in household income due to changes in the prices of goods will depend
on the income source. If the households’ income comes from wages, then income
changes will depend on the pass-through rate from prices to wages, unlike a situation
where the income comes from own-business sources. In this case, the changes in
marginal returns to labor triggered by a price change can lead to changes in the
hours worked or lead to new employment of previously unemployed members or
both. That is, there can be changes on the intensive and on the extensive margin
and, depending on the characteristics of the labor market, a price change in one
good can also lead to changes in the production, and thus employment, in other
goods (Jacoby, 2013).
In a second case, the position of the household as net consumer or net producer of
the good has been discussed in the literature in the past (for example Deaton (1989)).
If the analysis is restricted to one good, net consumers should lose from a price
increase and net produces should gain. In an analysis with several goods this
differentiation is difficult to achieve if not impossible.
Wage income constitutes a substantial part of non-rural total income, while
business income plays a larger role in rural areas5. Second, I argue that the
response time to a price change between both income types can vary. In both cases,
a composite measure of income would conceal any particular effects.
A third income source that has to be considered in the Mexican context is
transfer income. It does not have a direct link to a particular price change, but
Governments may try to compensate households for a serious loss in purchasing
power. Thus, the change in transfer income is attributed to the price changes,
although the link is not as straightforward is with the other two types of income.
For this reason I include changes in the transfer income without directly linking
them to a price change.
As all possible goods are taken into account, there are two lines at which groups
can be differentiated that are not producer or consumer. The first one is the
aforementioned distinction between wage or business income, the second will be
on the area of residence. Depending on the rural or urban status of the household
5Descriptive statistics to both can be found in Section 2.3
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it will have different options regarding goods and income opportunities. This
distinction is not only relevant as far as income is concerned, but is also interesting
regarding any consumption or substitution possibilities available to the household.
Lastly, while the reaction of the labor market to price changes is outside the
scope of this study, the relative changes in income that originate there are not.
Empirically, these relative changes will amount to changes in income across time
periods.
The impact a change in price pi of a commodity, i on household welfare can be
described by the overall (proportional) change in money-metric household welfare
(Janvry and Sadoulet, 2008; Jacoby, 2013; Robles and Torero, 2010; Ferreira et
al., 2013) that is composed of changes in income and changes in expenditure. Note
that at first glance this appears as a profit equation but actually refers, as stated
before, to the measure of money needed to maintain a certain utility level6.
dbh =
∆yh
yh
− ∆Eh
Eh
(2.1)
Where dbh is the money-metric change in household welfare,
∆yh
yh
stands for
relative changes in income and ∆Eh
Eh
for relative changes in expenditure in a household
h.
These are the two main contributors to welfare, the next step consists in
formulating expressions for both that can be estimated empirically.
The household minimum expenditure necessary to achieve an utility level U
is defined as Eh(p, U) where p is the vector of prices for goods: i = 1 . . . n. The
compensating variation (CV) is a measure of the income change a household needs
to realize the utility level achieved in the setting prior to a price change. The
CV is approximated here with a second order Taylor expansion with respect to
the initial price of the minimum expenditures Eh(p
0, U) where, p0 stands for the
prices at time period 0. Additionally, such an expansion will allow to account for
substitution behavior, as will be explained later7.
Eh(p, U) ≈ Eh(p0, U) +
[
∂E(p0, U)
∂p
]′
dp +
1
2
dp
[
∂2E(p0, U)
∂2p
]′
dp (2.2)
Rearranging (2.2) yields:
6The author thanks Johann Graf Lambsdorff for his comments on this point
7Friedman and Levinsohn (2002); Vu and Glewwe (2011); Robles and Torero (2010); Ferreira
et al. (2013) develop similar expressions for the CV.
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∆Eh(p, U) ≈
[
∂E(p0, U)
∂p
]′
dp +
1
2
dp
[
∂2E(p0, U)
∂2p
]′
dp (2.3)
In (2.3) ∂E(p
0,U)
∂p
is a vector and ∂
2E(p0),U
∂2p
is a matrix. Using Shepard’s Lemma
one can restate ∂E(p
0,U)
∂p
as the Hicksian compensated demand, h(p0, U). Rewrite
(2.3) as:
∆Eh(p, U) ≈
[
h(p0, U)
]′
dp +
1
2
dp
[
∂h(p0, U)
∂p
]′
dp (2.4)
Equation (2.4), the compensating variation, can be expressed as a fraction of
total expenditures, E. By simultaneously using proportional price changes we
achieve an expression with expenditure shares and elasticities. For this, define two
square matrices H ≡ diag(h(p, U)) and P ≡ diag(p) such that:
H =

h(p1, U) . . . . . . 0
0 h(p2, U) . . . 0
... . . .
. . .
...
0 0 . . . h(pn, U)
 and P =

p1 . . . . . . 0
0 p2 . . . 0
... . . .
. . .
...
0 0 . . . pn

Using these matrices, rewrite (2.4) as:
∆Eh(p, U)
Eh
≈ 1
Eh
[
h(p0, U)
]′
dp PP−1
+
1
Eh
1
2
dpPP−1
[
∂h(p0, U)
∂p
HH−1
]′
dp PP−1
Rearrange to obtain an expression with expenditure shares and elasticities:
∆Eh
Eh
≈ [ω]′
[
dp
p
]
+
1
2
[
dp
p
]′
[ΩΓ]′
[
dp
p
]
(2.5)
In Equation (2.5)
[
dp
p
]
is a vector of proportional price changes,
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ω =

h(p1,U)p1
E
h(p2,U)p2
E
...
h(pn,U)pn
E

is the vector of expenditure shares, Ω ≡ diag(ω) and
Γ =

∂h1
∂p1
p1
h1
. . . ∂h1
∂pn
pn
h1
...
. . .
...
∂hn
∂p1
p1
hn
. . . ∂hn
∂pn
p1
hn
 =
11 . . . 1n... . . . ...
n1 . . . nn

is the elasticity matrix where the elements of the main diagonal are the own-price
elasticities and those of the off-diagonal the cross-price elasticities.
The following expression restates the CV as a sum:
∆Eh
Eh
≈
n∑
i=1
ωi
∆pi
pi
+
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ωiij
∆pi
pi
∆pj
pj
≈
n∑
i=1
ωi
∆pi
pi
+
1
2
n∑
i=1
ωi
n∑
j=1
ij
∆pi
pi
∆pj
pj
(2.6)
The first term includes expenditure shares for goods i, ωi. It measures the
direct change in expenditures caused by a proportional price change in good i.
The second term accounts for substitution by including the own and cross-price
elasticities, ij. Thus, the expression for the CV developed here accounts for the
income and the substitution effects introduced earlier.
The first term on the right of (2.1), ∆yh
yh
, is the proportional change in in income,
which can be split up into wage income, business income and transfers.
The term ∆yh
yh
in (2.1) becomes:
∆yh
yh
=
n∑
i=1
Q∑
q=1
∆vq,i
yh
∆pi
pi
+
n∑
i=1
∆θi
yh
∆pi
pi
+
∆τ
yh
(2.7)
The first term corresponds to the change in wage income v of an individual q
earned in the production of a good i in the household h that has Q members. The
second one corresponds to the total business income θ earned in the household in
the production of good i. The third and final term represents state transfers, τ .
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Using the decomposed proportional changes in income, (2.7), and expenditures,
(2.6), we can rewrite (2.1):
dbh =
n∑
i=1
Q∑
q=1
∆vq,i
yh
∆pi
pi
+
n∑
i=1
∆θi
yh
∆pi
pi
+
∆τ
yh
−
n∑
i=1
ωi
∆pi
pi
− 1
2
n∑
i=1
ωi
n∑
j=1
ij
∆pi
pi
∆pj
pj
(2.8)
As in Ferreira et al. (2013) and Porto (2008), Equation (2.8) captures different
effects of changes in prices on household welfare:
1. A wage income effect: ρv =
n∑
i=1
Q∑
q=1
∆vq,i
yh
∆pi
pi
2. A business income effect: ρθ =
n∑
i=1
∆θi
yh
∆pi
pi
3. A transfer effect: ρt =
∆τ
yh
4. An expenditure effect: ρe =
n∑
i=1
ωi
∆pi
pi
5. A substitution effect: ρs =
1
2
n∑
i=1
ωi
n∑
j=1
ij
∆pi
pi
∆pj
pj
The net effect is then: dbh = ρv + ρθ + ρt − ρe − ρs
In practice, each income effect can be further decomposed into commodity
group components, for example food and non-food items.
The first four components can be estimated using expenditure and income
information extracted from several waves of the ENIGH and official price data. To
estimate the fifth component one needs to estimate first the corresponding price
elasticities.
Before I describe the details to the estimation procedures below in Section 2.3,
I start with a short description of the data.
2.3 Data and empirical strategy
This study relies on three waves of a nationally representative household survey on
income and expenditures and on an extensive and detailed set of officially levied
15
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monthly prices.
2.3.1 Prices
Unit values, the ratio of expenditure to quantity of a good, are commonly used
instead of prices when the latter are not available. Yet, the use of prices in welfare
analysis has two distinct benefits.
Unlike prices, unit values generated from household data contain in themselves
the quality decisions made by the consumers. If higher income households are
willing to pay more for a given good than lower income ones for that same good, then
unit value for a good will increase with increasing income. The positive association
between unit values and income can bias a welfare analysis because increases in unit
values will not accurately represent changes in quantity demanded (McKelvey, 2011;
Deaton, 1988)8.
On the other hand, unit values cannot be produced if the household does not
report the consumption of a good or if the amount consumed is not reported. This
implies that the unit values have to be imputed, usually by making assumptions
about the consumption level of household (Dybczak et al., 2010). The use of prices
foregoes any assumptions regarding consumption pattern and so of any assumptions
regarding the separability of preferences (Vu and Glewwe, 2011).
Prices were obtained from the DOF9 for different geographical points, so called
price stations. A Consumer Price Index (CPI) was computed for every point using
the official weights for the various items that constitute the underlying consumption
basket. Lastly, to each municipality prices are assigned according to its geographical
location. These procedures are described next.
Prices for 31410 items are levied monthly by the Banco de Me´xico (Banxico)11
in 46 different municipalities. These price stations were selected to be nationally
representative by the responsible organization. Table 2.B.1 lists these price stations.
Municipalities are second level administrative divisions, the next one being the
locality. In Figure 2.2 municipalities are delimited by black lines.
Using these prices and the weights from the consumer basket from June 2002, I
calculate the CPI for every price station using January 2004 as a base. With this
CPI I deflate income and prices into real values (Janvry and Sadoulet, 2008) and
simultaneously maintain regional variation.
8An affect that is unacounted here is quality substitution, i.e. when a price increase leads to
consumption of lower quality, and thus cheaper, items of one commodity group.
9Spanish for Diario Oficial de la Federacio´n
10In three cities (Me´xico D.F., Guadalajara, and Monterrey) a 315th price is levied, that for
the subway or the electric transportation system
11In June 2011 this task was reassigned to the INEGI
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Figure 2.1 relates the mean CPI level and its standard deviation. The largest
increase as well as the highest decline both occurred in mid-2008. The large
variation in CPI illustrates the divergence in prices for the various commodities at
different price stations.
Figure 2.1: CPI
Every municipality in the country was unambiguously assigned to the closest
price station by geodesic distance between the centroids of the municipality that is
the price station and the municipality where the household resided at the time of
the interview.
Figure 2.2 visualizes this procedure for three selected price stations. The prices
and CPI from the price station are imputed on the assigned municipalities. None of
the price stations is in a “rural” municipality, therefore, it is not possible to assign
municipalities to rural or non-rural price stations. Welfare effects in rural areas have
to be interpreted with this shortcoming in mind. An alternative assigment of prices is
conceivable: price stations and municipalities across the country could be matched
based on particular characteristics. The challenge would lie in choosing those
characteristics to appropriately reflect the consumption patterns. Furthermore, a
matching across the country would imply that the geographical component, which
greatly influences tastes and availability, would be lost.
17
2. WELFARE EFFECTS OF CHANGED PRICES. THE
“TORTILLA CRISIS” REVISITED
Figure 2.2: Selected price stations and municipality assignment
Notes: Shown here for selected price stations: Jua´rez (in the North), Heroica Matomoros (in the East) and
Acapulco de Jua´rez (in the West)
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Prices and households’ income and expenditures are reported at different ag-
gregation levels. On the expenditure side, prices levied and expenditure items in
the household surveys match according to an official key (Banco de Me´xico, 2011),
though at a higher level of aggregation than the orginal price data. On the income
side prices and income sources can be matched using the industrial classification12
of the workplace of each individual as well as the Mexican Classification of Occu-
pations13 and the National System of Classification of Occupations14, though again
at a higher level of aggregation the the original price data. Aggregation levels for
the income and the expenditure side are different and thus subsequently combined
into a harmonized aggregation level which yields 20 commodity groups which can
be grouped into food and non-food groups as is shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Food and non-food groups
Food Non-food
Tortillas, bread, cereals and similar Clothing, shoes and accessories
Maize and beans Housing
Meats and fish Furniture and household appliances
Milk and milk products Health and personal care
Eggs Transportation
Fruits Education
Vegetables and greens Leisure
Bottled fruits and legumes Other services
Seasonings, sugar, oils and fats
Beverages, incl. coffee
Candy, chocolates and tobacco
Food cooked outside of home
Figure 2.3 reports country-wide monthly mean percentage changes in relative
real prices for food and non-food groups with their respective standard deviations
for the years 2006− 2008. This figure exemplifies why the term “Tortilla Crisis”
is actually a misnomer, as it refers to only one item. The situation was more of
unequally volatile food price growth rates.
There are two spikes in food prices on the left panel in Figure 2.3: one at the
end of 2007 and one in the middle of 2008. Although the average growth rate is
roughly positive, the standard deviation around the spikes is sizeable, a reflection
of regional differences in price changes among food groups.
12Given by the North American Industrial Classification System, ‘SCIAN’ by its initials in
Spanish
13Clasificacio´n Me´xicana de Ocupaciones, ‘CMO’ by its initials in Spanish
14Sistema Nacional de Clasificacio´n de Ocupaciones, ‘SINCO’ by its initials in Spanish
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Figure 2.3: 12-month growth rates in real prices
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The INEGI divides the country into eight different regions15. Each graph in
Figure 2.4 shows the food price growth rates for food for each region.
The regions appear to be affected by large food price growth rate the most.
There are the northwest, northeast and the southeast
Table 2.2 reports mean 12-month growth rates of real food prices as well as
their mean standard deviations. Unlike cereals and other grains, growth rates for
meat declined.
Table 2.2: 12-months growth rates in real food prices
2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010
Commodity group Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Tortilla, bread, cereal and similar 3·6 10·1 3·1 15·8 8·7 28·8 2·7 18·4
Maize and beans 3·8 17·1 7·0 21·2 25·5 35·9 −0·8 24·2
Meat and fish −1·4 21·8 −5·5 14·9 8·5 31·1 2·4 19·9
Milk and milk products 9·3 133·9 3·7 18·3 3·6 28·1 1·9 19·0
Eggs 14·1 17·9 8·8 30·9 8·6 28·9 −7·2 18·6
Fruits 2·7 8·9 −5·2 15·7 4·5 28·8 4·6 18·4
Vegetables and greens 0·7 11·1 −6·0 15·8 6·4 30·2 9·2 22·4
Bottled fruits and legumes −0·1 15·7 11·3 144·1 32·6 197·8 2·1 24·0
Seasonings, sugar, oils and fats −6·7 21·0 4·8 92·2 5·3 44·7 1·6 21·6
Beverages, incl. coffee −3·5 10·2 −3·5 14·3 2·1 15·2 5·4 11·2
Candy, chocolates and tobacco 0·3 15·5 −1·4 20·0 3·1 29·9 7·0 21·4
Food cooked outside of home −1·0 9·8 −3·8 14·9 4·5 29·1 2·3 19·1
Source: Banxico, author’s calculations
The most drastic price increases are found between the years of 2007−2008 and
2008−2009, with 12-month growth rates between 20% and 60%. The large standard
deviations in Figure 2.3 are partly explained by very large standard deviations in
15The regions are Northwest (Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa
and Sonora), Northeast (Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas), West (Colima, Jalisco, Michoacan,
Nayarit), East (Hidalgo, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Veracruz), North-center (Aguascalientes, Guanajuato,
Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas), South-center (Mexico City, Mexico, Morales), Southwest
(Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca), Southeast (Campeche, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Yucatan)
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Figure 2.4: Food price growth rates by region
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single commodity groups, which are a result of price differences among the price
stations and reflect regional disparities.
Because the welfare effect will depend on the relative change in prices as well
as on the relative change in income and expenditures for each commodity group16,
welfare will evolve differently for households that experienced the same price changes
but differ in their income and expenditure patterns. Thus, for the analysis changes
between points in time of the variables of interest need to be observed.
Whereas the assessment relies on relative changes between points in time the
household data consists of repeated cross-section. Hence, it is not possible to
perform the analysis at the household level.
2.3.2 Unit of analysis
Approximately 60% of all municipalities surveyed appear in subsequent waves, with
199 municipalities being surveyed in every wave over the time period considered.
The analysis is performed for changes in the same municipality between two survey
waves. Specifically, the comparison is made at per capita municipality changes
in income and expenditure at every centile and decile of per capita expenditure.
Using per capita expenditures ensures comparability with the relevant literature
mentioned above (e.g.: Ferreira et al. (2013); Robles and Torero (2010)).
One concern that arises when analyzing municipality level changes is alterations
in the composition of the municipality that might drive the results, for example
a changed migration pattern. In Mexico, internal and external migration are
relatively low. According to the National Council for Population17 between the
years of 2005 and 2010 only around 1% of the population emigrated abroad and
around 6% migrated to a different municipality18. A large share of migration
occurs to municipalities at the borders and touristic areas Anzaldo et al. (2008);
Sobrino (2010). Nonetheless, I do not observe households across time and so, cannot
observe migration patterns. To limit the effect that migration could have over time
on the income and expenditure profiles, the analysis occurs between subsequent
survey waves and not, for example, between the years before and after the price
change. First, because price changes occur as a continuum and the setting of a
precise date for the beginning of the price increase would be arbitrary by any means,
and second, by observing such a short time period the changes for influences of
migration on the municipality income and expenditure characteristics are hopefully
minimized.
Another important dimension is the rural/non-rural divide. According to the
INEGI, a locality is rural if it has 2500 inhabitants or fewer. Each municipality is
16as outlined in Section 4.2
17CONAPO by its initials in Spanish
183% out of the federal state and 3% within the federal state
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composed of a number of localities. Using the information on the rural status of
the locality I can determine the median rural status of a municipality. In the years
2006− 2008 there were 220 rural and 309 non-rural municipalities and in the years
2008− 2010 245 rural and 381 non-rural ones.
Price stations are by choice of the incumbent agency municipalities with at
least 20000 inhabitants (Banco de Me´xico, 2013), thus no price station accurately
reflects the price dynamics in rural areas. Nevertheless, the differentiation between
rural and non-rural municipalities is relevant as income and expenditure profiles
are clearly different.
2.3.3 Household data
2.3.3.1 Income
Household data come from a biannual survey, the National Household Survey on
Income and Expenditures19 provided by the Mexican Statistical Office20 for the
years 2006, 2008, and 2010. This is a nationally representative cross-sectional
household survey that interviews between 20875 and 27665 households in over
900 different municipalities in each wave and contains information on the socio-
demographic characteristics of households and its members, as well as detailed
income and expenditure information.
Estimation of the wage, business and transfer income effects along the lines
shown in Section 4.2 requires that household income is reported by types and
source. Using information on the sector of activity and the occupation of the
individual21, income earned by any member of the household can be classified
as either wage income, business income or transfer income. The last one refers
to the widespread and ample governmental transfer programs in Mexico. The
first two income types can be further assigned to the commodity group in which
they were earned. The final steps involve deflating the income with the CPI (see
Section 2.3.1) and trimming the data by eliminating households in the first and
last percentiles in the total income and total expenditure distributions. Then
we generate municipality level weighted means as well as real relative changes in
income.
Figure 2.5 shows the mean per capita income levels pooled for all years by
income category. Overall income levels are higher in non-rural areas, although the
speed at which income increases across deciles is higher in rural ones.
To further illustrate the differences between rural and non-rural municipalities
and to further motivate our use of wage and business income, Figure 2.6 presents
19ENIGH by its initials in Spanish.
20INEGI by its initials in Spanish.
21Using the SCIAN, CMO, and SINCO detailed before
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Figure 2.5: Mean per capita income levels
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the mean income share for each income type. In addition we disaggregate the
income types by their source: food and non-food. The role of agricultural businesses
is larger in rural than in non-rural areas, therefore, food business income plays a
larger role in rural areas. Furthermore, transfer income is particularly important at
lower deciles, but much more so in rural areas. Because transfer income is awarded
in part due to economic status, these higher shares in the income constitution are
exemplary of the poverty situation in rural areas.
Income composition differs markedly between rural areas and their counterparts.
Whereas the major component of income in non-rural areas are wages, with more
than 65% in all deciles, in rural areas the components appear more balanced.
Nonetheless, we observe the save trend with respect to the income composition
in both areas: at higher deciles, most income is wage income, particularly of the
non-food kind.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the mean per capita income level across deciles for every
survey wave. To put these reported income levels into perspective, the mean rural
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Figure 2.6: Income composition by food and non-food
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Expenditure deciles Expenditure deciles
non−rural rural
Food wage Non−food wage Food business Non−food business Transfers
Income type
 
Sh
ar
e 
in
 to
ta
l in
co
m
e
Notes: Income shares computed for the ENIGH 2006, 2008 and 2010 waves. A locality has a rural status if it has
2500 inhabitants or less.
and non-rural poverty lines in 2004 were 1004.3 MXN per capita and 1637.1 MXN
per capita respectively22. In the rural setting this translates into an average poverty
headcount of approximately 40 %, while in non-rural areas this figure reaches
around 20 %.
Despite, it is clear that in both settings average per capita income increased in
all deciles between 2006 and 2008 and between 2008 and 2010.
2.3.3.2 Expenditures
Per capita food and non-food expenditure shares (Figures 2.8 and 2.9) display
the expected behavior: food (non-food) expenditure shares decline (increase) with
increasing deciles.
The increases in the expenditure share for food in the years 2008 and 2010,
which are mirrored by declines in the non-food shares, follows from the decline in
22Official SEDESOL values for July 2004, deflated with the CPI presented in this section.
25
2. WELFARE EFFECTS OF CHANGED PRICES. THE
“TORTILLA CRISIS” REVISITED
Figure 2.7: Decile mean per capita income levels
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overall expenditures caused by the decline in non-food expenditures in that same
time period. Particularly interesting is that real food expenditures remained largely
unchanged during the observed time period indicating that food expenditures are
largely unresponsive to inflation. To sustain unchanged expenditure levels despite
the inflation, households either spend less on other goods, which would explain the
lower levels of expenditures in non-food items, or sustain the consumption through
a higher income, or both. This last argument is consistent with the higher income
presented in Figure 2.7 above.
A cursory analysis would imply a positive effect of the price changes on welfare:
incomes increased while total expenditures decreased. Nonetheless, it is not clear
if the income increases are sufficient to compensate the for the price increases or
how the decline in non-food expenditures affects welfare. Furthermore, the changes
in income and expenditure presented above vary for each decile and by rural and
non-rural setting.
Overall, the net welfare effect will depend on the changes in prices, income and
expenditures. To further account for possible substitution effects, we compute the
26
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Figure 2.8: Food expenditure shares
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price and cross-price elasticities of the 20 commodity groups.
2.3.4 Elasticities
The compensated own- and cross-price elasticities which are needed to estimate
the substitution effect -ρs- are derived from Hicksian demand functions which
are in turn obtained from the estimation of a quadratic almost ideal demand
system (QUAIDS). This system, proposed by Banks et al. (1997), allows for non
linearities in the Engel curves by including a quadratic term in the expenditure
share equation23. The reason for choosing this demand system lies in following
similar studies and generating comparable results, albeit, according to Araar and
Verme (2016), the choice of demand system appears to be of minor relevance for
the results.
I estimated a QUAIDS controlling for rural status of the household and number
23See Section 2.A for the estimated system.
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Figure 2.9: Non-food expenditure shares
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of residents and obtained a full set of compensated own- and cross-price elasticities
for every single commodity group in every household in every wave. These elasticities
were aggregated at the municipality level in the same fashion as the income and
expenditure data detailed before.
Table 2.3 summarizes the compensated own- and cross-price elasticities for all
years without distinction between rural and non-rural households. The commodity
groups are listed both vertically and horizontally. Row elements react to a change
in the price in the column elements (Poi, 2012). Thus the diagonal elements
correspond to the own-price elasticities. For example, the own-price elasticity of
the group ”Tortilla, bread, and cereals” is −1.09: the demand for this group will
recede by 1.09% when the price for the same increases by 1%. Similarly, if the
price for ”Maize and beans” increases by 1% the demand for ”Tortilla, bread, and
cereals” will increase by 0.17%.
Overall the estimated elasticities are within a reasonable range, with no overly
large values, and possess no unexpected signs. For example, own-price elasticities
are always negative. As for the cross-price elasticities, the signs vary depending on
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Table 2.3: Compensated price elasticities
Commodity group Tortilla,
bread,
and
cereals
Maize
and
beans
Meat
and
fish
Milk
and
milk
prod-
ucts
Eggs Fruits Vege-
tables
and
greens
Bottled
fruits
and
legumes
Spices,
sugar,
and oil
Tortilla, bread, and cereals -1.09 0.17 -0.03 0.26 -0.03 0.39 0.35 0.04 0.19
Maize and beans 0.53 -1.61 -0.51 1.30 -0.01 -0.11 -0.15 -0.00 -0.30
Meat and fish -0.02 -0.10 -1.29 0.21 -0.03 -0.01 -0.25 -0.03 0.16
Milk and milk products 0.42 0.63 0.48 -0.30 0.01 0.33 0.37 0.02 0.11
Eggs -0.08 -0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.66 -0.32 -0.71 0.11 -0.01
Fruits 1.29 -0.11 -0.03 0.74 -0.33 -0.08 -0.22 -0.11 -0.09
Vegetables and greens 0.65 -0.10 -0.66 0.44 -0.41 -0.12 -1.90 0.38 -0.03
Bottled fruits and legumes 0.19 0.01 -0.18 0.08 0.18 -0.14 1.06 -0.93 0.03
Spices, sugar, and oil 0.63 -0.32 0.83 0.24 -0.01 -0.09 -0.05 0.01 -1.29
Beverage, incl. coffee 0.48 0.11 0.79 -0.23 0.22 -0.46 0.46 -0.05 -0.28
Sweets and tob. 0.08 -0.24 0.47 -0.00 0.47 0.09 0.98 0.15 -0.29
Food cooked outside of home -0.24 0.06 1.19 -0.63 0.05 0.04 0.54 -0.13 0.25
Clothing 0.03 -0.05 -0.19 0.38 -0.03 0.10 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02
Housing -0.19 -0.05 0.15 0.07 -0.00 0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.02
Furniture and household appl. 0.22 0.10 -0.01 -0.43 0.23 -0.15 0.04 0.04 0.06
Health and personal care -0.08 -0.01 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.03
Transportation -0.06 0.13 0.19 -0.44 0.07 -0.14 0.08 -0.06 0.08
Education -0.00 0.11 0.47 -0.37 0.07 0.10 0.30 -0.07 -0.06
Leisure -0.01 -0.26 -0.25 0.54 -0.32 -0.35 -0.75 0.10 -0.33
Other services 0.52 -0.16 -1.82 0.23 -0.17 0.22 0.12 0.16 -0.01
Notes: Calculated using ENIGH 2006, 2008, and 2010.
whether in the data those goods are complements or substitutes.
I estimate the substitution effect, ρs described in Section 4.2, using such an
elasticity matrix for every municipality for those years at the beginning of an
inter-wave comparison. the year 2010.
The next section presents the results of an estimation of the five effects described
in Section 4.2.
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Table 2.3: Compensated price elasticities (continued)
Commodity group Beve
rages
Sweets
and
tob.
Food
cooked
out.
Clothing Hou-
sing
Furni-
ture
and
house.
app.
Health
and
per-
sonal
care
Trans-
por-
ta-
tion
Educa-
tion
Leisure Other
ser-
vices
Tortilla, bread, and cereals 0.28 0.01 -0.18 0.02 -0.37 0.23 -0.18 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 0.08
Maize and beans 0.16 -0.15 0.11 -0.10 -0.31 0.34 -0.04 0.73 0.33 -0.13 -0.06
Meat and fish 0.29 0.06 0.50 -0.12 0.20 -0.01 0.13 0.24 0.30 -0.05 -0.18
Milk and milk products -0.19 -0.00 -0.64 0.59 0.21 -0.67 -0.02 -1.02 -0.54 0.19 0.06
Eggs 0.37 0.28 0.13 -0.07 0.04 0.69 -0.02 0.41 0.22 -0.21 -0.07
Fruits -0.81 0.04 0.08 0.35 0.32 -0.48 0.02 -0.70 0.30 -0.27 0.11
Vegetables and greens 0.42 0.31 0.58 -0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.06 0.22 0.48 -0.32 0.04
Bottled fruits and legumes -0.12 0.14 -0.42 0.01 0.29 0.23 0.04 -0.38 -0.32 0.10 0.12
Spices, sugar, and oil -0.52 -0.19 0.53 -0.02 -0.12 0.24 0.18 0.43 -0.20 -0.26 -0.01
Beverages, incl. coffee -1.04 -0.07 -0.33 -0.03 -0.07 0.23 0.31 0.40 -0.61 0.23 -0.08
Sweets and tob. -0.18 -1.23 -0.09 -0.06 0.17 0.05 0.12 -0.49 -0.43 0.21 0.21
Food cooked out. -0.25 -0.03 -1.13 0.32 -0.49 0.13 0.29 0.06 0.14 -0.04 -0.12
Clothing -0.03 -0.02 0.17 -1.04 0.21 -0.00 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.01
Housing -0.03 0.01 -0.22 0.13 -0.33 -0.12 0.21 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.04
Furniture and house. app. 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.01 -0.18 -0.93 0.05 0.59 -0.05 0.09 0.14
Health and personal care 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.26 0.03 -1.06 0.37 0.02 0.08 0.01
Transportation 0.12 -0.06 -0.01 0.12 0.11 0.37 0.35 -1.15 0.17 0.08 0.06
Education -0.34 -0.09 0.08 0.15 0.13 -0.05 0.03 0.34 -0.81 -0.03 0.06
Leisure 0.56 0.17 -0.07 0.58 0.68 0.27 0.51 0.57 -0.21 -1.33 -0.10
Other services -0.31 0.27 -0.60 0.09 0.47 0.94 0.14 0.64 0.35 -0.15 -0.92
Notes: See above.
2.4 Results
The five effects identified in Section 4.2 are estimated using local polynomial
regressions (Friedman and Levinsohn, 2002; Porto, 2006)24 at every percentile of
real per capita expenditure. Results are presented at the decile mean and for
two different situations: overall price changes and changes in food prices, first as
nationwide changes and then disaggregated for rural and non-rural areas.
2.4.1 Effects on welfare of changed overall prices
2.4.1.1 General effects
The estimated effects are reported as percentages of initial per capita expenditures
for all municipalities, without distinguishing between rural and urban ones. For the
first two years these are the subsequent years, afterwards the comparison occurs
biennially. Results for the for periods 2006− 2008 and 2008− 2010, i.e. those with
the sharpest price changes, are reported in Figures 2.10 and 2.11.
Percentage changes in initial income due to the price increase are reported on
the vertical axis. Negative (positive) values convey the percentage of income in the
initial period that should be added (subtracted) in that percentile to income in the
comparison period to achieve the initial welfare level. For example, a household
in the first decile in 2006 would need on average 101.25% of its 2006 income
24Ferreira et al. (2013) use a similar approach
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Figure 2.10: Net effect due to overall price changes, 2006-2008
31
2. WELFARE EFFECTS OF CHANGED PRICES. THE
“TORTILLA CRISIS” REVISITED
Figure 2.11: Net effect due to overall price changes, 2008-2010
to achieve in 2008 the same level of welfare as in 2006 because this percentile’s
percentage changes in initial income is of about −1.25%. A welfare change of zero
percent means that negative and positive changes balance themselves out and not
necessarily that there was no change at all.
Figure 2.10 plots the mean changes between 2006 and 2008 as well as its
standard deviation. The mean line in Figure 2.10 lies above the zero line for all
deciles, indicating that, on average, there were no net losses, with the fourth decile
having the largest mean gains. Yet, the plot of the standard deviation shows
that at least within the first seven deciles there were some losses. As opposed to
that, the Figure 2.11 shows net mean losses across all deciles for the time between
2008 and 2010 except for the three richest deciles that display an an average net
change of zero. Losses, indicted by the spread of the standard deviation into the
negatives, are larger and more predominant that any gains during this time period.
The spread of the welfare changes tightens around zero at the upper end of the
expenditure distribution but is very wide at its lower end. For example, in the first
decile a household would need on average approximately 115% of its 2008 income
to achieve in 2010 the same level of utility as in 2008; but the welfare changes in
that same decile stretches from positive 5% to negative 40%. An explanation for
this very wide spread might be the pooling of rural and non-rural municipalities.
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Because both types have different income compositions as well as average income
levels, results might be counterintuitive. Particularly in the first deciles do average
income per capita differ markedly. For the year 2010 average income per capita in
the first decile in rural areas amounted to 1000 Mexican Pesos, in non-rural areas
1500; a 50% difference.
Before exploring rural and non-rural differences in the next Section, I turn to
the composition of the welfare change. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the composition
of the mean net effects depicted in Figures 2.10 and 2.11 above. In the columns
are those effects outlined in Section 4.2. The first three columns relate changes in
welfare to changes in the following income sources: wages income, business income
and transfer income. Next are welfare changes due to changes in expenditures and
substitution followed by the net effect. Tables for the periods 2004 − 2005 and
20005− 2006 can be found in Section 2.B.
Table 2.4: Breakdown of the overall effect for 2006− 2008
Decile Effect
Wage
income
Business
income
Transfers Expenditures Substitution Overall
(ρw) (ρθ) (ρt) (−ρe) (−ρs) (db)
1 −2·05 −2·23 −0·51 2·42 0·65 −1·72
2 −1·43 −2·88 2·78 5·73 0·67 4·87
3 −0·86 −1·48 1·59 4·54 0·70 4·50
4 −2·03 0·40 0·41 10·09 0·47 9·30
5 −1·54 −1·63 0·34 6·25 0·59 3·97
6 −1·81 −0·51 −0·32 5·40 0·48 3·24
7 −0·09 −2·12 −0·06 6·68 0·47 4·87
8 −2·01 −0·58 −0·13 8·23 0·55 6·06
9 −1·48 −0·61 −0·02 5·39 0·49 3·77
10 −1·78 0·02 0·05 8·00 0·38 6·66
Source: ENIGH, Banxico, author’s calculations
Both the expenditure and the substitution effects enter Equation 2.8 with a
negative sign. Welfare is defined as the monetary amount needed to maintain a
certain utility level; an estimated positive expenditure or substitution effect relates
to us the percentage of initial income that would be needed to be spend in order to
maintain a given level of utility, thus a positive expenditure or substitution effect
diminishes welfare. A positive substitution effect though, would only happen if
the own- or cross-price elasticities were positive, and that is never the case in the
data. Hence, the substitution effect always affects welfare positively. In the Tables
that report the breakdown of each effect both the expenditure and the substitution
effects are accounted for with the sign with which they contribute to the welfare
change.
33
2. WELFARE EFFECTS OF CHANGED PRICES. THE
“TORTILLA CRISIS” REVISITED
Table 2.5: Breakdown of the overall effect for 2008− 2010
Decile Effect
Wage
income
Business
income
Transfers Expenditures Substitution Overall
(ρw) (ρθ) (ρt) (−ρe) (−ρs) (db)
1 −0·79 −4·17 3·06 −16·19 1·70 −16·40
2 −1·00 −2·71 −0·85 −4·39 1·09 −7·77
3 −0·02 0·09 −0·01 −8·01 0·87 −7·08
4 0·46 −1·08 1·27 −7·25 0·74 −5·87
5 −1·45 −0·40 −1·21 −2·34 0·70 −4·69
6 −0·71 0·31 −0·75 0·29 0·69 −0·17
7 −1·30 0·04 0·60 −2·91 0·53 −3·03
8 −0·85 −0·10 0·13 0·62 0·70 0·50
9 −0·94 −0·60 0·07 0·67 0·48 −0·33
10 0·08 0·00 0·06 0·65 0·32 1·11
Source: ENIGH, Banxico, author’s calculations
Between 2006− 2008 most deciles experienced small average net gains, which
are in part due to welfare gains because of the expenditure and the substitution
effects offsetting the losses incurred due to negative changes in both wage and
business income. Thus, in this first time period, changes in welfare came from
modest negative changes in income and large enough changes in expenditures.
This is not at all the case in the next period, where the losses, specially in the
lower deciles. Both the substitution and the transfer effects, although substantial,
are too small to offset the combined negative effects of the negative income effects
and large expenditure effects. The expenditure effect is large, regressive and
dominates the evolution of the net effect.
2.4.1.2 Rural and non-rural effects
The distinction between rural and non-rural areas is important beyond determining
the size of a community. As Ferreira et al. (2013) state, different labor markets
and accessibility to commodity groups can lead to different welfare effects. An
indication that both income and expenditure profiles are different was provided
above.
Figures 2.12 and 2.13 depict the welfare changes for the years 2006− 2008 and
2008− 2010 separately for rural and non-rural areas.
Splitting the analysis into rural and non-rural areas reveals differences that
were not visible before. In the 2006 − 2008 period, non-rural areas experienced
no negative welfare changes on average: the mean line is always in the positive
range. While this is also the case for rural areas, the effects in this case are lower
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Figure 2.12: Net effect due to overall price changes, 2006-2008
for middle income deciles. It becomes clear that the lumping together the two
different areas actually overstates the losses, particularly in the lower deciles.
In contrast in the 2008− 2010 period, welfare changes turn into the negatives
and the behavior of the mean as well as the standard deviation is less smooth than
in the pooled analysis.
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 provide the breakdown of the net effect into its components
for the period 2006− 2008 and allow us to pinpoint the effect driving the behavior
of the mean curve.
In line with the results obtained for whole country, both rural and non-rural areas
display positive welfare changes that stem from the expenditure effect, although,
on average, these are larger in non-rural areas. This effect is the driver of the
positive welfare changes in the non-rural setting because it is large enough to offset
the negative wage and business income effects. This is only partly the case in rural
areas, where the expenditure effect is not always large enough to offset the (mostly)
negative income. In both cases the net effect is driven by the expenditure effect.
The mean welfare change during 2008 − 2010 for both settings is negative:
there are almost no positive effects of wage or business income, and only minor
positive effects stemming from the transfers. Unlike the previous two-year period
where expenditures actually had a positive effect, in this period expenditures
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Figure 2.13: Net effect due to overall price changes, 2008-2010
had a principally negative effect on welfare that is never fully counteracted by
the substitution effects. Nonetheless, the inclusion of other effects besides the
expenditure effect matters for the magnitude of the net welfare affect and provides
a more nuanced picture of the components of welfare change.
As reported in Section 2.3.1, the largest price increase observed during the crisis
was for foodstuff. The next section presents a welfare analysis that concentrates on
changes of foodstuff prices alone.
2.4.2 Effects on welfare of changed foodstuff prices
2.4.2.1 General effects
The aim in this section is to compute the welfare changes accounting for changes
in food prices alone.
The main advantage of considering changes in food prices separately from
changes in all prices is that it allows us to see how close, or far, both measures are
to one another. Because complete data on consumption and expenditures profiles
as well as on the respective prices is rarely available, it is common to use only food
prices. In a high (food)-inflation environment, as are some of the time periods
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Table 2.6: Breakdown of net effect in the non-rural setting 2006− 2008
Decile Effect
Wage
income
Business
income
Transfers Expenditures Substitution Overall
(ρw) (ρθ) (ρt) (−ρe) (−ρs) (db)
1 −1·55 −3·62 2·33 7·92 0·61 5·48
2 −0·73 −0·24 1·34 7·21 0·53 8·05
3 −1·64 −1·44 1·13 6·24 0·84 4·90
4 −0·89 −0·66 0·43 3·55 0·55 2·98
5 −0·79 −1·63 0·09 6·50 0·33 4·50
6 −0·31 −1·41 0·29 8·04 0·61 7·18
7 −1·75 0·06 −0·47 7·70 0·44 5·98
8 −2·39 −1·62 −0·04 8·89 0·54 5·38
9 −1·23 −0·46 0·17 5·58 0·65 4·70
10 −1·47 0·28 −0·04 8·88 0·29 7·94
Source: ENIGH, Banxico, author’s calculations
considered in this study , measures of welfare change could be decisively different
when food prices are used as opposed to when all prices are considered because
expenditure and income shares associated with food items vary across deciles and
between rural and non-rural areas. This feature of any welfare analysis and its
consequences has to be considered, particularly if the aim is to device efficient and
well-targeted interventions.
For the welfare analysis which only considers food price changes, price changes
in non-foodstuff commodity groups25 are set to zero and Equation (2.8) is esti-
mated again, thus replicating the approach taken in the literature by studies that
concentrate solely on the impact of foodstuff prices (e.g. Ferreira et al. (2013);
Friedman and Levinsohn (2002)).
Any income source that is not related to a food item as well as any expenditures
in non-food and substitution between food and non-food items is not taken into
account. Thus the only effect that remains unchanged from the previous Section is
the transfer effect, which enters the welfare equation without any relationship to a
price change.
As in Section above, results for the years 2006 − 2008 and 2008 − 2010 are
presented below, both overall and disaggregated for non-rural and rural areas.
Results for the years 2004− 2005 and 2005− 2006 can be found in Section 2.B.
The overall results for both time periods show a smaller mean welfare change
with a decisively tighter spread compared to the scenario where I consider price
changes in all goods.
25See Table 2.1
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Table 2.7: Breakdown of net effect in the rural setting 2006− 2008
Decile Effect
Wage
income
Business
income
Transfers Expenditures Substitution Overall
(ρw) (ρθ) (ρt) (−ρe) (−ρs) (db)
1 −2·68 −3·40 5·29 2·03 0·66 1·18
2 0·01 0·01 −4·46 6·84 0·69 3·93
3 −0·64 0·17 4·04 1·86 1·09 5·10
4 −1·41 −2·31 −1·37 4·88 0·71 1·16
5 −3·38 −0·27 0·18 2·24 1·00 −0·02
6 −0·22 −0·08 1·45 10·44 0·63 11·58
7 −0·46 0·09 −0·63 7·22 0·40 7·15
8 −2·24 −0·13 −1·57 4·96 0·49 2·76
9 −1·35 −0·88 −2·46 5·03 0·66 1·79
10 −1·18 −0·05 0·15 6·33 0·71 5·85
Source: ENIGH, Banxico, author’s calculations
Food price changes contributed minimally to any welfare gains during the years
2006− 2008; most gains present in the analysis with all prices are gone as can be
seen in Figure 2.14. While the mean gains reached a maximum of approximately
7% in the analysis with all prices, here it barely extends to 2%, none of the gains
identified in the initial analysis are longer present: none of them are directly
associated with changes in food prices.
In comparison, the mean losses identified for the 2008− 2010 period are still
present for only food items and display a very similar behavior across deciles.
Furthermore, the spread is, again, very small.
Particularly for this last period, one that was marred by high food price inflation,
concentrating only on food price changes does not change much of the computed
mean welfare losses. It appears that in this particular case the losses were induced
almost exclusively by the high food prices.
The decomposition of the net welfare effect for the years 2006 − 2008 and
2008−2010 in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 substantiates these observations: in 2006−2008
the expenditure effects that contributed largely to the positive net welfare effects
observed in the previous section are absent while in 2008− 2010 the expenditure
effects that made up a large part of the negative welfare changes remained in
place, although they are largely regressive over the deciles. Of important interest
appear the substitution effects in the second two-year period. As Janvry and
Sadoulet (2008) speculated, during the food price surge these effects are, in some
cases, large enough to offset the negative income effects, and in some cases, larger.
Moreover unlike the previous two-year period, the effect is strongest in the lower
deciles and regressive, indicating that substitution is used mostly by the poor as a
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Table 2.8: Breakdown of net effect in the non-rural setting 2008− 2010
Decile Effect
Wage
income
Business
income
Transfers Expend. Subst. Overall
(ρθ) (ρt) (−ρe) (−ρs) (db)
1 1·91 −2·52 −0·15 −20·65 1·81 −18·33
2 2·86 −0·94 −0·11 −0·32 0·26 1·57
3 −0·68 −0·63 0·09 −11·66 0·69 −12·19
4 −1·57 −1·27 −0·61 −0·31 0·99 −2·73
5 −1·16 −0·01 0·47 −0·38 0·55 −0·54
6 −1·21 0·23 0·17 −1·45 0·62 −1·66
7 −1·46 −0·05 0·12 −0·45 0·74 −1·10
8 −0·93 −0·53 0·03 2·45 0·54 1·56
9 −0·21 0·00 −0·12 −1·32 0·27 −1·38
10 −0·01 −0·02 0·17 1·74 0·36 2·24
Source: ENIGH, author’s calculations
way of maintaining a given utility level.
Overall losses at the lower end of the distribution appear highly connected to
food prices, more so during high food price inflation, a logical implication of their
higher expenditure shares in foodstuff as depicted above in Figure 2.8.
The next section explores the differences in welfare effects between rural and
non-rural status.
2.4.2.2 Rural and non-rural effects
Results for rural and non-rural areas for both time periods permit to account for
the different income and expenditure profiles, although I do not expect these results
to vary widely from the pooled results as most of the gains appear to stem from
non-food items. Thus I would expect to see mean welfare change curves for both
settings that are a downward shifted version of those where all prices are taken
into account.
And so it is that welfare changes due to food price changes in this disaggregated
setting (Figures 2.16 and 2.17) do not differ substantially from the non-disaggregated
ones (Figures 2.14 and 2.15), but there are differences with respect to an analysis
that includes the non-food items.
In the first period, 2006− 2008, municipalities experience almost none of the
positive expenditure effects that were reported when the non-food items were
included and thus much of the positive welfare change is absent. Again, this
indicates that welfare gains can be attributed to changes in non-food items. This is
true for both rural and non-rural municipalities (Tables 2.B.2 and 2.B.3). Although
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Table 2.9: Breakdown of net effect in the rural setting 2008− 2010
Decile Effect
Wage
income
Business
income
Transfers Expend. Subst. Overall
(ρθ) (ρt) (−ρe) (−ρs) (db)
1 0·78 −6·64 1·22 −20·58 2·06 −24·08
2 −1·83 −1·07 1·04 −4·10 0·28 −5·41
3 −1·74 −1·40 0·15 1·31 0·86 −0·87
4 −2·14 −1·29 −0·78 −10·68 0·96 −12·45
5 1·53 0·14 0·55 −6·99 1·24 −3·78
6 −1·68 −0·55 −2·88 −1·76 0·86 −3·97
7 −1·54 0·48 −1·74 1·20 0·66 −0·21
8 −1·38 −0·76 −2·31 1·06 0·86 −1·47
9 −0·20 −0·02 −0·20 −0·16 0·45 −0·02
10 1·21 −0·21 0·77 −1·55 0·60 0·46
Source: ENIGH, author’s calculations
the positive expenditure effect is lost, non-rural municipalities experience smaller
negative and even positive income effects, both from wages and business, which
helps to achieve the modest welfare gains. These effects originate most likely in
the lower share of income generated in food related activities in non-rural areas.
During the high food inflation years, 2008− 2010, non-rural households appear
to be more severely affected than rural ones, particularly in the lower expenditure
deciles: the differences in the welfare change between deciles are smaller in the
non-rural setting. This behavior is not observed in the analysis that includes
non-food items, although it is difficult to estimate its economic relevance just from
these Figures. An exercise on the extent of changes in poverty rates due to changes
in welfare later on will provide some insight.
A comparison of the composition of the welfare effects with and with-out non-
food items provides insight on the source of the differences in the welfare estimate
between both.
As stated above, (negative) mean welfare changes for rural and non-rural
municipalities are smaller when only food items are taken into account in the
analysis. In the years of high food inflation, the expenditure effect is as large as
its counterpart when non-food items are included, as can be seen from comparing
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 with their analogs in the section above. This is particularly
striking for the lower deciles in both the rural and non-rural setting, because there
the effects are the largest.
Finally, the average substitution effects are particularly large in the first deciles
and there is little difference between rural and non-rural. For example in the
non-rural setting, the substitution effect alone can off-set the negative income
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Figure 2.14: Net effect due to food price changes, 2006-2008
(wage and business) effect in the first five and in the non-rural in at least the first
three deciles. It is also relatively large, with a relative size of approximately a
fourth of the expenditure effect and significantly contributes to ameliorating the
welfare change in several cases.
During high inflation times, the welfare of the poor is hit the strongest, be it
solely food items or not. A separate analysis of non-rural and rural municipalities
indicates that there is not much difference between both, with the negative welfare
effect stemming principally from a large expenditure, low business income and
negative wage income effects. This is consistent with the large media and social
attention that was devoted to the so-called “Tortilla Crisis” 26.
The results also indicate that rural and non-rural areas are no different when
it comes to substitution. It has been argued that rural areas would have better
opportunities to substitute away from expensive food items, but this does not seem
to be the case in this context.
A comparison of the welfare changes elicited by changes in all prices and one
that takes into account only food prices concludes that non-food goods played an
26For example: http://www.elmundo.es/mundodinero/2007/01/31/economia/1170261989.
html
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Figure 2.15: Net effect due to food price changes, 2008-2010
important role in generating welfare gains, but this appears to be the case only
when inflation was not so high, or only at early stages of an inflation period. During
a low inflation period, a welfare analysis limited to food prices overstates the losses
incurred, but during a high food inflation period, such an analysis will provide
quite precise measures, at least on the mean.
The results presented here only show the gains and losses at certain levels of
per capita expenditure but not how the welfare changes impacted the position of
each municipality in the expenditure distribution. The next section analyses the
effects of price changes on poverty.
2.4.3 Impacts on poverty
Mexico’s CONEVAL27 reports two different monthly per capita poverty lines: the
minimum nutritional line and the minimum well-being line. Both are reported
for rural and non-rural areas. Using these lines and the CPI at the price station
level introduced in Section 2.3.1, I construct real poverty lines and use them in
this section to conduct a poverty assessment. Hence,I work with 92 poverty lines,
27National Council for the Evaluation of Social Policy, by its initials in English
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Table 2.10: Breakdown of net effect (food prices) 2006− 2008
Decile Effect
Wage
income
Business
income
Transfers Expenditures Substitution Overall
(ρw) (ρθ) (ρt) (−ρe) (−ρs) (db)
1 −1·52 −1·56 3·63 −0·19 0·52 0·88
2 −0·24 −0·59 1·29 0·03 0·49 0·99
3 0·05 −0·43 1·95 −0·26 0·40 1·71
4 −0·57 −0·75 0·52 0·52 0·35 0·07
5 −0·34 −0·83 0·41 0·56 0·27 0·06
6 −0·16 −0·15 −0·40 0·14 0·25 −0·32
7 −0·11 −0·65 0·70 0·07 0·17 0·17
8 0·04 −0·24 0·28 0·02 0·11 0·21
9 0·10 −0·23 0·03 −0·09 0·14 −0·05
10 −0·04 −0·10 0·28 0·11 0·11 0·37
Source: ENIGH, Banxico, author’s calculations
46 for rural areas and 46 for non-rural areas in accordance to the number of price
stations and thus of computed CPI. Mean values on these lines can be found in
Table 2.B.4 28.
The summary measures of poverty used here are the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke
(FGT) measures, i.e. the poverty headcount (FGT0), the poverty gap (FGT1) and
the poverty severity (FGT2) indexes (Foster et al., 1984; Foster et al., 2010).
To compute the impact of welfare change on poverty I adjusted the municipality
level real per capita expenditures by the calculated welfare change for the case
when changes in all prices are considered and alternatively for the case where only
changes in food prices are considered and computed the difference to the unadjusted
case. That is, I computed each poverty measure with the survey data. Then I
adjusted the expenditures in each case by the amount needed to achieve the utility
level of the first period in the second one. For example if the welfare change was
−14.48 as computed for the first decile in the analysis for the years 2008− 2010 for
changes in food prices (Table 2.12), to achieve the same level as utility in 2010 as in
2008, municipalities in this decile would need on average 114.48 of the expenditures
per capita they had in 2008 in 2010. We computed the poverty measures anew
with the adjusted measures and subsequently calculated the difference between
the unadjusted and the adjusted ones. This was done by adjusting for the welfare
change estimated when all prices are taken into account and when only food prices
are allowed to changed as well as for rural and non-rural areas. The results is
the comparison of poverty measures between two alternative scenarios: one with
28To compute changes in the poverty changes for 2006, I used data from the ENIGH 2005
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Table 2.11: Breakdown of the net effect (food prices) 2008− 2010
Decile Effect
Wage
income
Business
income
Transfers Expenditures Substitution Overall
(ρw) (ρθ) (ρt) (−ρe) (−ρs) (db)
1 −1·78 −0·53 0·67 −15·89 4·52 −13·01
2 −1·35 −0·07 1·17 −8·92 2·41 −6·76
3 −0·01 −0·12 1·46 −6·83 1·66 −3·84
4 0·03 −0·62 0·26 −5·92 1·76 −4·50
5 0·02 −1·07 −0·67 −3·24 0·55 −4·42
6 0·22 −0·44 −0·35 −2·25 0·48 −2·33
7 0·13 −0·11 0·38 −1·75 0·34 −1·01
8 −0·07 −0·30 0·28 −1·13 0·21 −1·02
9 −0·02 −0·34 0·21 −0·70 0·14 −0·70
10 0·03 0·04 0·12 −0·28 0·08 −0·00
Source: ENIGH, Banxico, author’s calculations
and one without the welfare consequences of the price changes. Results for the
well-being lines are reported in Table 2.14 and those for the nutritional lines in
Table 2.B.5.
Because of how the difference between poverty measures is computed, a negative
difference means that the price change had a positive effect on poverty alleviation:
the poverty measure after adjusting the expenditures is higher. This is only possible
if the per capita expenditure after the adjustment is lower than before, i.e. to
reach the utility level of the previous period less expenditure per capita is needed,
and this is the case when the net welfare effect is positive. Conversely, a positive
difference in the poverty measures means that the price change had a negative
effect on welfare: once I compensate for the changes incurred due to the price
change the poverty measure decreases.
The differences reported in Tables 2.14 and 2.B.5 have to be interpreted dif-
ferently for each poverty measure. The poverty headcount index, FGT0, is the
share of individuals whose per capita expenditure lies below the poverty line in
the total population. Hence, the reported values can be interpreted as percentage
point differences in the share of poor between the two alternative scenarios. The
poverty gap index, FGT1, is a measure of the distance between the expenditure
per capita and the poverty line and so reports how far on average the poor are
from the poverty line. An increase in this measure amounts to a deepening of
the poverty, with poor individuals falling even lower below the poverty line. This
measure reports the average distance from the poverty line. Because every distance
is weighted equally, this measure does not provide any information regarding the
expenditure distribution of the poor, that is, a transfer of income from a poor
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Figure 2.16: Net effect due to food price changes, 2006-2008
household to another that is richer (but below the poverty line) will not necessarily
lead to an increase of the FGT1. A decrease in this measure can be achieved by
bringing those close to the poverty line even closer without changing the position
of the extreme poor. A decrease in this poverty measure can be interpreted as
the change in the monetary amount needed to bring every poor individual to the
poverty line, with this monetary amount being a share of the poverty line.he poverty
line needed to bring every poor individual to the poverty line. The poverty severity
index, FGT2, is the square of the poverty gap and so it is the sum of the weighted
poverty gaps for each individual, with the weights being in proportion to the gap
itself, i.e. individuals further away from the poverty line have larger weights.
Changes in the poverty measures for the well-being line are larger than those
for the nutritional line, an expected result considering that the nutritional line is
about 2/3 of the well-being line. During the crisis time periods of 2006− 2008 and
2008− 2010 changes in the poverty measures due to food price changes follow those
due to changes in all prices more closely in rural than in non-rural areas, although
this is only valid for the well-being poverty line and not for the nutritional line.
Furthermore, poverty measures for the well-being line in non-rural areas are
affected to a greater extent by changes in food prices than by changes in all
prices. For example, the poverty headcount between 2008− 2010 increased by 0.34
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Figure 2.17: Net effect due to food price changes, 2008-2010
percentage points due to changes in all prices. For changes in food prices alone that
figures amounts to 0.72. With a population share of 81% and a headcount ratio fo
67% for the well-being line, an increase in one percentage point in the headcount
ratio in this demographic translates into approximately 9 million individuals more
in poverty. The changes in food prices also increased the average distance the poor
are from the poverty well-being line as well as deepened the poverty. While the
results for the FGT1 and FGT2 are small, they are considerable larger than their
counterparts in rural areas.
The values in Table 2.14 provide valuable insight into the consequences of the
unchecked price changes, particularly in the discrepancy that exists between rural
and non-rural areas.
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Table 2.12: Breakdown of net effect in the non-rural setting 2008− 2010
Decile Effect
Wage
income
Business
income
Transfers Expend. Subst. Overall
(ρθ) (ρt) (−ρe) (−ρs) (db)
1 −2·78 2·57 1·25 −20·84 5·11 −14·68
2 0·37 −0·29 0·44 −10·64 3·24 −6·88
3 0·22 −1·49 −0·23 −6·12 1·34 −6·28
4 0·46 −1·18 −0·34 −3·71 0·38 −4·40
5 0·26 −0·01 0·51 −1·95 0·49 −0·70
6 0·11 −0·09 0·31 −1·72 0·30 −1·09
7 −0·13 −0·38 0·28 −1·05 0·21 −1·07
8 −0·05 −0·32 0·16 −0·70 0·16 −0·74
9 0·03 0·06 0·10 −0·80 0·11 −0·50
10 0·05 0·09 0·11 −0·09 0·08 0·24
Source: ENIGH, author’s calculations
Table 2.13: Breakdown of net effect in the rural setting 2008− 2010
Decile Effect
Wage
income
Business
income
Transfers Expend. Subst. Overall
(ρθ) (ρt) (−ρe) (−ρs) (db)
1 −1·18 −1·76 −0·65 −16·08 4·44 −15·22
2 −1·40 −1·33 1·88 −10·37 3·74 −7·49
3 −0·86 −0·80 1·15 −2·82 1·30 −2·03
4 −0·39 −0·59 2·02 −6·54 1·50 −4·00
5 0·39 −0·22 1·61 −5·81 1·10 −3·27
6 −0·36 −0·52 1·24 −1·91 0·50 −1·05
7 −0·46 −0·33 0·16 −0·66 0·27 −1·02
8 −0·33 −0·16 −1·04 −0·91 0·43 −2·02
9 −0·03 −0·21 −0·60 −1·31 0·35 −1·80
10 −0·07 −0·84 0·56 −0·70 0·12 −0·94
Source: ENIGH, author’s calculations
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Table 2.14: Poverty changes (well-being line)
Poverty line Net impact of 2005 2006 2008 2010
Non-rural
All prices
FGT0 0.07 -0.11 0.34 0.24
FGT1 0.05 -0.04 0.10 0.12
FGT2 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.05
Foodstuff prices
FGT0 0.62 0.48 0.72 0.93
FGT1 0.17 0.11 0.18 0.27
FGT2 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.10
Rural
All prices
FGT0 0.15 -0.07 0.06 0.15
FGT1 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.09
FGT2 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.04
Foodstuff prices
FGT0 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.13
FGT1 0.03 -0.00 -0.00 0.07
FGT2 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.04
Source: CONEVAL, author’s calculations
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There is almost no evidence regarding the welfare effects of the food price hikes
that affected Mexico over the period 2006 to 2010. The evidence that is available
typically focuses just on few channels by which such price hikes can affect welfare
and they typically focus only on food and neglect other goods that experienced
significant price changes.
This study presented a comprehensive framework to analyze the welfare effects
of prices changes. The analysis considers income and expenditure effects and
decomposes the total welfare effects in its various contributors. The study accounts
for all prices but also offers a detailed analysis of what was called in the media the
‘Tortilla crisis’.
The results show that changes in the prices of non-food items make up a large
part of the total welfare change and more so in high inflation years, i.e. in the
period 2008− 2010. The inclusion of non-food items in the analysis changes the
results by introducing welfare gains that are unaccounted for when only food items
are considered.
The comparison of an analysis with and without changes in the prices of non-
food items reveals that non-rural areas, as most households there are net buyers of
food, experienced larger welfare losses when only food items are considered. These
results may explain the social unrest evoked by the increased tortilla prices that
peaked at the beginning of 2007. Non-rural areas were the most vocal about the
strain the increased prices in this staple of the Mexican diet was exerting on them,
and rightly so. This study shows that the inclusion of changes in prices in non-food
items contributed to welfare gains, i.e. a focus on food price changes alone clearly
leads to an over estimation of the losses.
Unlike other studies, this study highlights the importance of including differ-
entiated income as well as substitution effects. The results show that the income
effects implied substantial welfare losses, particularly for the poorest deciles. Both
the business as well as the wage income effect are mostly negative and when they
are positive, they are relatively small. During the years 2006 − 2008 when food
price inflation was not salient, the negative contribution of the income effects to
welfare significantly off-sets part of the positive effects associate with pure price
effects. This is particularly visible in the first deciles and in rural areas more
generally: the pure expenditure effect leads to positive welfare changes while the
total effect, i.e. including income effects leads to negative welfare changes. Such
an overturning of the direction of the welfare change becomes less likely when the
negative expenditure effect is relatively large, as it was the case during the high
food price inflation years. Nonetheless, the estimates of the welfare changes are
definitely more accurate if it is accounted for all possible channels. Particularly in
lower deciles the business income effect can amount to a fourth of the expenditure
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effect. In fact, the income effects are negative in almost all years.
The contribution of the substitution effects are also substantial. In some
cases these effects are as large as a fourth of the net welfare effect. They can
even completely offset negative income effects and contribute positively to the
welfare change. As expected, these effects play a larger role when only food items
are considered, but their relevance is only slightly reduced when prices for other
items are included. These effects are also reportedly larger in the first half of the
expenditure distribution and more so during the years of high food price inflation
and contribute to a large extent to counter negative expenditure effects when only
food prices are taken into account.
The welfare changes were contextualized with a poverty assessment. The mean
welfare changes in rural and non-rural areas during times of high food inflation are
very similar, with the poorest having the largest losses and the losses being larger
in non-rural areas, but the poverty impact is larger in rural areas.
Although the ”Tortilla Crisis” was a national phenomenon, and the reporting
focused on larger urban areas, losses were almost as large for the poorest decile
in the non-rural areas as in the rural ones, with the added aggravation that the
poorest decile in rural areas is closer to the poverty line than the poorest decile
in non-rural areas. Thus the ‘Tortilla Crisis’ had a larger poverty impact in rural
areas.
In sum, the inclusion of differentiated effects provides a deeper understanding of
the contributors to welfare changes as well as more precise estimates of the effects
associated with the ‘Tortilla crisis’. This study shows that a focus on expenditure
effects alone can be very misleading; although accounting for income effects may not
imply a reversal of the expenditure effect but it may at least reduce it substantially.
An important extension of this work would be the inclusion and differentiation of
consumer and producer prices (Janvry and Sadoulet, 2009), because the consumer
prices will most likely skew the effects of the producers and the overall effect
depending on the relative distribution of consumers and producers in the rural and
non-rural areas.
Moreover, substitution between food commodities appears to play an important
role in the survival strategies of the poor. A valuable extension would be the
analysis of the unintended consequences of such substitution effects. It is for
example possible that significant changes in the diet of the poor can have long
lasting negative health effects. For instance Juarez Torres (2015) shows that the
nutritional patterns of food and non-food poor individuals are different, as are their
nutrient elasticities for certain products. She concludes that rising food prices in
certain food commodities (cereals and vegetables) could aggravate the nutritional
condition of the the most vulnerable population segments as they substitute away
into items with less nutritional content.
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2.A The Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand Sys-
tem (QUAIDS)
The QUAIDS (Banks et al., 1997) is based on an indirect utility function of the
form:
lnV (p,m) =
[{
lnm− ln a(p)
b(p)
}−1
+ λ(p)
]−1
Where ln a(p) is a translog of the form:
ln a(p) = α0 +
k∑
i=1
αi ln pi +
1
2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
γij ln pi ln pj (2.A.1)
In (2.A.1) pi is the price for a good i for i = 1 . . . k and b(p) is the is the simple
Cobb-Douglas price aggregator:
b(p) =
k∏
i=1
pβii
and
λ(p) =
k∑
i=1
ln pi
Homogeneity, symmetry and adding-up imply the following restrictions:
k∑
i=1
αi = 1,
k∑
i=1
βi = 0,
k∑
i=1
γij = 0 and γij = γji(2.A.2)
Applying Roy’s Identity to 2.A and defining the expenditure share of a household
as wi = piqi/m we obtain the corresponding expenditure share equations system:
wi = αi +
k∑
i=1
γij ln pj + βi ln
{
m
a(p)
}
+
λi
b(p)
[
ln
{
m
a(p)
}]2
For the construction of the Slutsky matrix we are interested in the compensated
price elasticites. The estimation of these occurs with use of the user written
command ‘quaids’ for Stata c© from Poi (2012), that also allows us to include
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demographic variables29 and that imposes the restrictions in (2.A.2) automatically.
2.B Supplementary Tables
Table 2.B.1: List of price stations
A-L M-V
Acapulco de Jua´rez Me´rida
Aguascalientes Mexicali
Benito Jua´rez Monclova
Chetumal Monterrey
Chihuahua Morelia
Ciudad Acun˜a Oaxaca de Jua´rez
Colima San Andre´s Tuxtla
Co´rdoba San Francisco de Campeche
Corta´zar San Luis Potos´ı
Cuernavaca Santiago de Quere´taro
Culiaca´n Rosales Santo Domingo Tehuantepec
Fresnillo Tampico
Guadalajara Tapachula de Cordova y Ordon˜ez
Hermosillo Tepatitla´n de Morelos
Heroica Matamoros Tepic
Heroica Puebla de Zaragoza Tijuana
Huatabampo Tlaxcala de Xicohtencatl
Iguala de la Independencia Toluca de Lerdo
Jacona de Plancarte Torreo´n
Jose Mariano Jime´nez Tulancingo
Jua´rez Veracruz
La Paz Victoria de Durango
Leon de los Aldama Villahermosa
29Folowing Ray (1983)
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2.B.0.1 Net welfare effect (foodstuff)
Table 2.B.2: Breakdown of net effect in the non-rural setting 2006− 2008
Decile Effect
Wage
income
Business
income
Transfers Expenditures Substitution Overall
(ρw) (ρθ) (ρt) (−ρe) (−ρs) (db)
1 0·34 −1·29 2·27 0·59 0·45 2·36
2 0·18 −1·01 1·54 0·78 0·39 1·88
3 −0·34 −1·44 0·99 0·05 0·34 −0·40
4 −0·27 −0·32 0·68 −0·40 0·25 −0·07
5 −0·20 −0·37 0·20 −0·26 0·24 −0·39
6 0·28 0·06 0·52 0·31 0·07 1·24
7 −0·04 −0·18 0·06 0·12 0·07 0·04
8 0·14 −0·33 −0·05 −0·11 0·18 −0·18
9 0·10 −0·15 0·06 0·01 0·13 0·15
10 −0·10 −0·11 0·33 0·08 0·12 0·31
Source: ENIGH, Banxico, author’s calculations
Table 2.B.3: Breakdown of net effect in the rural setting 2006− 2008
Decile Effect
Wage
income
Business
income
Transfers Expenditures Substitution Overall
(ρw) (ρθ) (ρt) (−ρe) (−ρs) (db)
1 −2·15 −2·75 6·51 −0·02 0·60 2·18
2 −1·17 −0·81 −1·98 0·68 0·55 −2·73
3 −1·19 0·83 0·98 −0·28 0·50 0·84
4 −0·28 −0·53 0·82 −1·36 0·43 −0·93
5 −0·31 0·09 1·98 −1·89 0·41 0·28
6 −1·02 −0·33 −0·39 0·65 0·36 −0·73
7 −0·42 −0·45 0·69 1·60 0·25 1·67
8 −0·21 0·04 −1·54 1·11 0·22 −0·39
9 −0·24 −1·08 0·16 0·56 0·24 −0·36
10 −0·13 −0·46 0·94 −0·37 0·14 0·12
Source: ENIGH, Banxico, author’s calculations
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2.B.0.2 Poverty lines and poverty dynamics
Table 2.B.4: Real monthly per capita poverty lines
Year Rural Non-rural
Nutritional SD Well-
being
SD Nutritional SD Well-
being
SD
2006 623.2 47.4 1,279.5 97.3 904.4 68.8 2,080.0 158.1
2008 929.6 269.3 1,819.6 527.1 1,324.2 383.6 2,908.1 842.4
2010 1,066.8 133.0 2,076.9 258.9 1,527.0 190.3 3,310.0 412.6
Source: CONEVAL (National Council for the Evaluation of Social Policy), author’s calculations
Table 2.B.5: Poverty changes (nutritional line)
Poverty line Net impact of 2005 2006 2008 2010
Non-rural
All prices
FGT0 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03
FGT1 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
FGT2 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
Foodstuff prices
FGT0 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.04
FGT1 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01
FGT2 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
Rural
All prices
FGT0 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.08
FGT1 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
FGT2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01
Foodstuff prices
FGT0 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.07
FGT1 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.02
FGT2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
Source: CONEVAL, author’s calculations
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3The Geographical Expansion of
Drug Cartels and Property Crime
in Mexico
3.1 Introduction
Between 60000 and 70000 drug-related murders were committed in Mexico (Shirk
and Wallman, 2015; Caldero´n et al., 2015) in the decade between 2006 and 2016,
or around 7000 a year. This surge in violence coincides with the introduction of
aggressive actions in the “War against Drugs” by then President Felipe Caldero´n
to curb the activities of Drug Trafficking Organizations (henceforth DTO).
In this study I seek to evaluate if DTO presence had any effect on property
crime. To do so first, I outline the historic and ongoing relationship between
DTO and property crime and argue that by its nature, the DTO is interested in
suppressing activities not related to their core business and that is presence will
negatively influence the property crime rate. I then provide supportive evidence for
this argumentation through an empirical analysis conducted in three steps: first,
I analyze the effect that the state intervention had on DTO presence and thus,
on its geographical expansion. Then I use available crime data to investigate how
the DTO presence influences property crime. Finally, I use the variation in DTO
presence that stems from the state intervention to examine changes in property
crime. This multi-step approach allows me to document the possible relationship
between the government policy, the DTO presence, and changes in crime.
There are three predominant explanations for the role of the government in the
surge of violence: it is either the unintended consequence of democratization or
of the “kingpin” strategies that aim at incapacitating the heads of the DTO, or
both. Proponents of the first explanation argue that the democratization process
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disturbed a long standing political and economical status-quo between the ruling
political party and the DTO. The intermission of other political parties led to
uncoordinated geographical areas where the DTO resorted to violence to secure
themselves against competitors as well as against representatives from the newly
empowered political opposition. Proponents of the second explanation, that of
“kingpin” strategies, purport that an intervention aimed at eliminating the heads of
the DTO in an effort to curb its activities was at the root of the increase in violence.
This unintended consequence originates in the destabilization of the DTO, causing
intra- as well as inter-DTO violence besides eliciting a backlash from the DTO
against the state (Caldero´n et al., 2015; Osorio, 2015). Finally, a combination of
both is also conceivable, although difficult to assess empirically.
With regard to violence and territorial presence of the DTO, the “War against
Drugs” of the Caldero´n presidency is largely regarded as a failure. Nonetheless,
seizures of cocaine in the USA, the main staple of Mexican DTO, have declined
from shy under 200 tons in 2005 to 37 tons in 2013. If this is due to lower or better
trafficking or lower demand remains an open question (United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, 2016).
Because trade routes and geographical control are priorities in the business
of drug trafficking, any disruption in the control and defense capacities of any
DTO will attract contending DTO to settle, if not in the targeted municipality, in
neighboring areas. As for the effect on crime, a DTO that settles in a previously
not controlled area is both interested in the revenues that can be accrued from
other types of crime besides drug trafficking as well as in limiting the expansion
of any resident criminals; either because they are a threat or because the attract
negative attention. Hence, the DTO can have an interest in taxing the criminal cell
for a part of their revenue or to coax away individuals involved in property crime
into the ranks of the DTO. In some cases, the DTO have been documented to be
taking over criminal activities not related to drug trafficking. Examples include
the taxing of transporters of agricultural products under the threat of violence1.
Extortion is a property crime under the Mexican law and it is included in the
analysis presented here but the recorded values are most likely not representative
of the actual incidence of this type of crime.
Parallel to the exacerbation of the violent conflict came an increase in the total
number of municipalities where any given DTO showed presence. According to
data provided by Coscia and Rios (2012), the share of municipalities with presence
of at least one DTO went from 10 % to 30 % between 2005 and 2010, as can be
seen in Table 3.1. A fracture of several DTO into contending groups occurred
at the same time. Osorio (2015) argues that the spatial diffusion of DTO action
and interaction stems from the disruptive nature of the state intervention: The
1http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2013/07/20/opinion/017a2pol
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intervention destabilizes the military force of a given DTO and makes it more
appealing for their competitors to intrude into the territory of the weakened DTO
as well as to expand into further unoccupied ones without fear of competition. This
line of argumentation is complementary to that of the unintended consequences
of “kingpin” strategies. While the expansion as well as the fractionalization of
DTO had started before the all-out “War on Drugs”, it is conceivable that it
accelerated the process by ways of disruption. The intervention can also foster the
geographical diffusion by means of inciting infighting in any given DTO. As the
“immobilization” of the any leaders creates a power vacuum within the organization,
hopeful successors try to reach for power. To do so, they need to demonstrate that
they can contribute to maintaining and possibly expanding the power of the DTO,
hence some individuals will branch out into neighboring areas to try and bring
these under DTO control.
Caldero´n et al. (2015) argue that kingpin strategies disrupt the chain of command
allowing local criminal cells to switch from drug trafficking to (other) criminal
activities to increase their revenue. The authors propose that this will only be the
case if the head of the organization wants to limit predation against the general
population during the time they are undisturbed. A similar line of argumentation
comes from Schelling (1984). He argues that a criminal organization is not a
cohesive entity but one that is comprised of a head or a core and a set of cells or
individuals that work for the organization in a controlled area. A cell working in
an area controlled by an organization is taxed for part of its proceedings under the
guise of, for example, so-called protection. The cell’s participation in the taxation
scheme will be enforced by the superior organization as a way of signaling its
strength and competence to outside competitors as well as other cells; this includes
punishing stray or recalcitrant cells either financially or physically.
In dealing with the criminal cells the organization has two main interests: first,
to keep the cells small enough that they do not threaten its hegemony or interfere
with their own business and second, to treat every cell equally. The former interest
aims at increasing its revenues and criminal standing, the latter at avoiding internal
conflict. Consequently, the cell will try to extract as much income as possible
from those it predates upon while simultaneously cowering away from the larger
organization so as to not be punished or eliminated.
An intervention focused at incapacitating or eliminating the leaders of an
organization, if successful, disturbs the status quo and with it the geographic
control the respective DTO might have. Once the loss of leaderships puts a DTO
into a vulnerable position, other DTO have an increased incentive to spread into
areas as close to the fringes of the sphere of influence of the affected DTO as
possible. A new DTO regime in an area without any former DTO presence will
establish its order by subduing any criminal cells soon as possible. Alternatively,
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Table 3.1: DTO presence
Year Mean St. dev. Max. Obs. Share
1991 1.0 0.0 1.0 6 0.00244
1992 1.2 0.4 2.0 5 0.00203
1993 1.1 0.3 2.0 22 0.00895
1994 1.1 0.3 2.0 29 0.01180
1995 1.1 0.4 2.0 20 0.00814
1996 1.2 0.4 2.0 31 0.01261
1997 1.1 0.2 2.0 48 0.01953
1998 1.1 0.4 2.0 43 0.01750
1999 1.1 0.3 2.0 28 0.01139
2000 1.1 0.4 3.0 53 0.02157
2001 1.3 0.7 4.0 55 0.02238
2002 1.1 0.4 3.0 49 0.01994
2003 1.4 0.6 4.0 77 0.03133
2004 1.5 0.7 4.0 116 0.04721
2005 1.6 0.7 4.0 225 0.09157
2006 1.6 0.9 6.0 297 0.12087
2007 1.7 0.9 5.0 402 0.16361
2008 1.9 1.1 8.0 588 0.23931
2009 2.1 1.2 8.0 655 0.26658
2010 2.1 1.3 9.0 70 9 0.28868
Source: Coscia and Rios (2012), author’s calculations. Statistics
over all municipalities with at least one DTO present (Obs.).
Share refers to the share of municipalities in the country with
at least one DTO present. Max. is the maximum number of
DTO active, mean is the average number of DTO active in that
year in all municipalities where at least one DTO was active
(thus the minimum is at least one). The maximum number of
DTO active in a year is also the number of existing DTO in the
sample. The number is capped at 9 as of 2010.
58
3.1 Introduction
there are reports of (forced) recruitment by the DTO in Mexico, and by organized
crime in general in other countries (e.g.: Dorn et al. (2005)). Both the taxation
and the recruitment can lead to a reduction in property crime.
One such intervention was started by the then Mexican Presidency in 2006.
It explicitly focused state and particularly military attention to detaining or
eliminating the leaders of any DTO in an attempt to curb their activities. The
state sanctioned offensive began the 11th of December 2006 with two operations:
“Operacio´n Michoaca´n” and “Operacio´n Baja California” meant to apprehend or
incapacitate the heads of two cartels. These operations were followed by other in
almost all parts of the country (Espinal-Enr´ıquez and Larralde, 2015).
Coincidently, starting with the intervention, national levels of property crimes
(dispossession and ouster, property damage) started dropping. Figure 3.1 depicts
this decline, with a marker for January 2007.
Figure 3.1: Evolution of property crime over time
Notes : Source is SEBOG, depicted data is national mean levels for every month using
Federal State reported crime data. There are five totals in each month, one for each
type of property crime: breach of faith, damages to private property, dispossesion,
extortion and fraud.
Despite the wealth of studies examining the effects of the presence of DTO
on homicides as well as of studies the dynamics of crime and its determinants
(for example: Bazzi and Blattman (2014); Benson et al. (1992); Bu¨ckner and
Ciccone (2010); Caldero´n et al. (2015); Castillo et al. (2013); Corona Jua´rez (2014);
Dell (2015); Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2015); Draca and Machin (2015); Enamorado
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et al. (2016); Espinosa and Rubin (2015); Guerrero Gutie´rrez (2011); Lessing (2015);
Lindo and Padilla-Romo (2015); Osorio (2015); Phillips (2015)), to my knowledge
there is no study that directly assesses the influence of the DTO on property
crime, even though there are reports linking both (Caldero´n et al., 2015; Guerrero
Gutie´rrez, 2011) 2. This lack of studies is in part because of the methodological
challenges such an assessment poses. As far as high crime rates in a municipality
are a product of weak law enforcement, DTO can be more likely to show presence
because the costs of fighting and bribing the respective law enforcers are lower
than doing so in municipalities with low crime rates and probably stronger law
enforcement. Conversely a DTO intruding into a municipality with high crime
rates will incur costs from establishing its dominance over the criminal cells, hence
making it more appealing to show presence in those municipalities with low crime
rates. Thus, it is important to account for the possible selection process of the
DTO in their quest for geographical dominance in order to control for possible
simultaneities that will bias the estimates of the relationship between the presence
of the DTO and the municipality level property crime rates.
Although the exact welfare costs of crime are difficult to assess, there is an
understanding of their general magnitude and burden to society. R. Soares (2015)
cites material costs in Latin America and the Caribbean of 5 percent of GDP
besides the intangible associated with crime: behavioral changes and impacts on
the labor market being just two.
I use data on killed or immobilized DTO bosses from Caldero´n et al. (2015)3
between 2006 and 2010 and DTO presence generated by Coscia and Rios (2012)4
to illustrate the channel between the intervention and the geographical expansion
and fractionalization as well as judicial crime reports at the municipality level from
the INEGI, night time lights and other controls to explore the relationship between
DTO presence and property crime.
I find that past successful interventions in neighboring municipalities help explain
the presence and the number of DTO in any given municipality. Furthermore, there
is a negative relationship between measures of DTO presence and criminal activity.
In the next section I put forward in detail the argument for the negative
relationship between the DTO and property crime. Next I present the data and
provide results and discussions from the empirical exercise. The last section
concludes.
2A study that tackles a similar question is the one in Jones (2013), where the author explores
the side effects of the kingpin strategies on kidnappings perpetrated by a specific DTO
3The authors generously allowed the use of their data
4The authors generously allowed the use of their data
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3.2 Concept
3.2.1 Influence of the kingpin strategy on the geographical
spread of DTO
The geographical expansion of the DTO (Gonza´lez, 2015) reported after 2006 is
driven by several factors.
One is the contagion and displacement explanation. For Mexico, Corona
Jua´rez (2014) shows that increases in drug crime in a region lead to increases of
drug crimes in neighboring regions. Furthermore, drug enforcement in a region
leads to more drug crimes in neighboring regions. Thus, there is a transmission of
criminality and it would seem, a displacement of the illegal activities. In neither case
are the causes completely explored. In the first instance a know-how transmission
appears to be at work, whereas the second one appears to be a consequences of
the redistribution of law enforcement. If police where to move from low crime
areas into neighboring high-crime areas, crime could increase in those areas left
without sufficient law enforcement. In a study of the US state of Florida, Benson
et al. (1992), shows that there is an important effect of drug enforcement policy
on property crimes through the changed allocation of police resources away from
property crimes and towards drug enforcement. Nevertheless, if this was the case
in Mexico we would observe an increase in property crimes and that is not the case.
Furthermore, there appears to have been no redistribution of law enforcement in
Mexico: the strategy of the Mexican government, i.e., to incapacitate or eliminate
those individuals in the upper echelons of the DTO, was performed with the help
of the state military and counter-insurgency forces.
Another explanation is the destabilization of the chain of command and the sub-
sequent internal restructuring processes of the DTO. As Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2015)
detail, while the precise internal structure of any DTO is not known accurately the
basic structure is: an inner circle controls several semi autonomous subsidiaries. If
argue in line with Caldero´n et al. (2015) and Osorio (2015) that the neutralization
of leadership members destabilizes the chain of command and creates incentives
for other DTO to push into challenged territory in a bid to expand the number of
trading routes controlled (Dell, 2015) and simultaneously advertise their prowess
as new commanders of the organization.
By threatening the use of violence, e.g. through protection rackets, the DTO
limits the income earning abilities of the criminal cell making crime less profitable.
At the same time the DTO might recruit individuals out of the criminal cells for
its own purposes5. Furthermore, if a DTO is confronted with several cells under its
control, one of its main concerns is to treat every single one it deals with equally,
5The recruiting is not always voluntary.
61
3. THE GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSION OF DRUG CARTELS
AND PROPERTY CRIME IN MEXICO
so as to avoid any confrontations and to maintain the cost of controlling as low as
possible, so we expect every cell to be treated equally.
Thus, by destabilizing different areas and different DTO, the kingpin strategy
has two unintended consequences: one direct and one indirect. It directly increases
the presence of DTO in the country and it indirectly decreases the level of property
crime.
I argue that in an area where a DTO suffers the state intervention, i.e. loses
one of its leaders, it will become weak enough for its neighboring areas to become
liable to the presence of rival DTO. This is because the costs of taking control are
unlike lower than before the state intervention. This effect will be more pronounced
for those municipalities with no presence of any DTO before the state intervention.
If a municipality without previous DTO presence is taken over, the new DTO will
establish itself as soon as possible and part of this, will be quickly subduing the
existing criminal cells.
One caveat remains: It is also feasible that crime reporting decreases because
of the use of intimidation tactics by the cell or the DTO itself. Intimidation to
abstain from reporting crimes to the authorities has been reported in the past as
well as lack of reporting due to distrust in the local authorities (INEGI, 2015).
To analyze the reasons for the lack of reporting is beyond the scope of this study,
nonetheless it is worth mentioning that probably not all crimes are affected by
underreporting due to intimidation in the same manner.
3.2.2 The relationship between the DTO and the criminal
cell
The term “cartel”, which is used widely to refer to the DTO, is misleading as in
the DTO is not a cartel in the economic science sense. The DTO do not collude
to fix prices, in fact, conflict within and between DTO is common (Dell, 2015)
and is usually resolved either through the use of violence or bribery (Guerrero
Gutie´rrez, 2011).
A DTO is a business engaged in illegal activities (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2015;
Dell, 2015; Guerrero Gutie´rrez, 2011; Schelling, 1984), the main one being the
transportation of illicit substances; for this it competes with other DTO in develop-
ing and securing trade routes with the aim of minimizing the transportation costs.
It simultaneously has to fend off attacks of law enforcement representatives that
want to stop DTO activities. For this reasons, geographical control is paramount
in the business of the DTO, and most of the violence between DTO and between
DTO and law enforcement representatives arises from the struggle for control,
particularly of crucial areas, so called plazas (Lessing, 2015; Dell, 2015).
In addition, DTO have been linked to a host of other criminal activities like
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kidnapping, extortion, prostitution, auto theft, money laundering and protection
rackets (Guerrero Gutie´rrez, 2011; Jones, 2013). This secondary operations are
typically controlled by local cells (Dell, 2015) that are accountable to the DTO
that controls the area 6. While the precise internal structure of the DTO is not
known7, an increasing number of criminal cells have been linked to collaborate with
the DTO for protection from the police, drug supply and financial gain (Guerrero
Gutie´rrez, 2011). For the DTO, the cell offers territorial know-how as well as
other efficiency gains by providing a source of muscle force that is not part of the
core business and as such presents no danger in case of an apprehension by the
authorities or by any rivals (Dell, 2015).
Standard theory states that a criminal will commit a crime on the basis of
a cost-benefit analysis (e.g. Becker (1968); Draca and Machin (2015)). In this
framework the criminal, or what I call the cell, obtains income from a crime and
faces certain costs if he is unsuccessful (e.g. fines, forgone income due to jail time
(Becker, 1968)) When the DTO arrives and subdues the cell it can tax the cell or
(forcefully) recruit its members away, or both. The taxation lowers the income
that is obtained from the criminal act while simultaneously giving the cell access
to the services of the DTO. These services include the bribing or intimidating
of law enforcement officials as well as law representatives8; both are actions that
lower the apprehension probability and the fine: a bribed official will not file a
report, an intimidated judge will pronounce a more lenient sentence. The DTO
can simultaneously recruit members away from the cell and engage them in illicit
activities of a different nature. In that case property crime would also fall, but it is
unclear if the effect would be long-lasting as other individuals could fill up empty
spots.
In sum, if a DTO controls an area, it influences the number of activities that
the criminal cells perform by taxing them or recruiting them away. Thus when a
DTO captures an area, I expect the crime rates to decrease with respect to areas
where no DTO is in control, all other things being equal.
6A type of forced ”franchising”, where single individuals as well as local criminal cells have
been forced to take part in criminal activities has been anecdotally documented, for example in
Saviano (2014). Guerrero Gutie´rrez (2011) report that the Zetas Cartel is known to force illegal
migrants to work for them, killing them if they refuse
7The secretive inner working of organized crime have spawned a series of books that range
from ”McMafia” (Glenny, 2009) to ”Narconomics” (Wainwright, 2016)
8Or both; the tactic of offering individuals the choice between the money or their life (know
as plata o ploto, i.e. the silver or the lead) is widespread (Shirk and Wallman, 2015)
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3.3 Data and variables of interest
3.3.1 Crime data
The crime data used here is the judicial (processed) crime data available from
Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography9 and comprises monthly
crimes at the municipality level for the years 2006− 2010. There are a few benefits
to these data: the occurrence of the crime has been confirmed, it does not contain
duplicates of crimes, as a crime can be reported more than once by more than one
affected individual, and the data of occurrence of the crime has been confirmed.
The judicial crime data is available until 2012, after which it is no longer reported.
Every year published contains crimes for almost all past years, as the data is
published once the crime is processed and not when the alleged crime is reported.
Thus the data for the years 2006−2010 was extracted from the information reported
in the years 2006 to 2012 in an effort to obtain a database as complete as possible.
Criminal activities of interest are property crimes. In Mexico property crimes
include theft, dispossession, property damage, and fraud. In general, with the
possible exception of fraud, these crimes do not lie in the general field of interest of
the DTO whose explicit interest lies in the geographical control of trade routes for
drug trafficking. Nonetheless, there is a growing body of literature that links DTO
activity and crimes only tangentially interesting for the drug trade, for example
the theft of crude oil and its reselling.
The focus lies on property crime as violent crimes in the DTO turf war, such
as rape and homicide, contain an element of demonstration and submission very
much linked to the DTO and not precisely to a criminal cell submissive to it10
Figure 3.2 visualizes the change in property crime in every municipality between
2006 and 2010. In this time period the rate of property crime declined generally
and particularly in the center, the pacific coast and the Yucata´n peninsula. At the
same time, property crime increased in certain areas, particularly in the north east.
3.3.2 DTO presence data
I use DTO presence data compiled by Coscia and Rios (2012) from different
internet resources. It provides yearly muncipality level observations for a total of
10 different DTO for the years of 1990− 2010. Of interest for the analysis are only
the observations from 2006 onward.
9INEGI by its name in Spanish
10The SNSP has developed six different characteristics to consider a homicide a DTO related
one. These include signs of torture or severe lesions; bodies that are taped or gagged; and others
(Enamorado et al., 2016).
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Figure 3.2: Growth rate property crime 2006 -2010
While the dataset contains municipality level observations for different DTO, I
do not analyze any differences the DTO may exhibit with respect to crime, only
the possible effect of the presence of any DTO.
3.3.3 State intervention
Data of the successful state interventions, this are the month and municipality
of the death or capture of a general or a lieutenant of a given DTO, is the one
assembled and used in Caldero´n et al. (2015)11. It contains municipality monthly
observations on the capture of a leader or a lieutenant between 2006 and 2010
compiled for official government sources.
Figure 3.4 visualizes the municipalities where a DTO head (leader or lieutenant)
was either detained or eliminated between the years of 2006 and 2010. There were
a total of 76 successful intervened municipalities with 97 confirmed immobilized
11I thank the authors for allowing me to use their dataset.
65
3. THE GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSION OF DRUG CARTELS
AND PROPERTY CRIME IN MEXICO
Figure 3.3: Cumulative DTO presence 2006− 2010
DTO heads.
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics
Besides data on property crime, the state intervention and the DTO presence,
I include variables to control for sociodemographic characteristics. The main
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.4: Municipalities with a successful government intervention 2006− 2010
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
Crime category
Theft 24.16 41.63 0 639
Other property crime 13.90 29.37 0 954
DTO presence
DTO (=1) 0.212 0.409 0 1
Nr. of DTO 0.411 0.946 0 9
State intervention
Any capture (=1) 0.045 0.207 0 1
Nr. of captures 0.010 0.134 0 4
Other characteristics
ln(tot. population) 9.317 1.535 4.62 14.37
Per capita night lights 0.096 0.084 0.00 1.43
Male population 15-39 years old % 0.184 0.025 0.10 0.34
Male population 15-39 years old (absolute) 8364.670 27135.722 13 414495
Unemployment rate 3.389 1.524 1.18 8.17
Notes: There are 12200 observations (2440 municipalities for 5 years). Crime is reported crime per
100 thousand population. Source: INEGI. DTO presence was compiled by Coscia and Rios (2012), one
municipality in 2010 is missing DTO information, thus the total number is 12199. Total population,
male population and measures of state intervention were compiled by Caldero´n et al. (2015). There
were successful interventions in 76 municipalities with a total of 97 captures between 2006 and 2010.
Per capita night lights is the municipality-pixel year mean, source: NOAA. Unemployment rate the
yearly average at the federal state level, source: BIE.
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3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 State intervention and DTO expansion
I use data on DTO leaders and lieutenants captured or eliminated between 2006
and 2010 for each municipality12 to estimate the effect it had on the presence
of DTO in its neighboring municipalities13. While the data on the captures is
a monthly municipality panel, the presence data is a yearly municipality panel.
Thus, the unit of analysis is municipality year. For this I aggregated the yearly
number of reported leader or lieutenant captures in each municipality and created
a dummy variable called Capture for any capture or elimination in a neighboring
municipality. Neighboring municipalities are those that share a border with the
municipality in question.
One major concern is the extent to which the choice of the government to
intervene in a municipality is independent of the explanatory variables used. The
policy was aimed at curbing the actions of all DTO, but it is unrealistic that the
governments actions were not opportunistic and beset with political maneuvering.
Did the government intervene in municipalities with a larger number of deaths to
assuage public concerns, or was it less costly to intervene in poorer municipalities?
It the policy was placed endogenously it will bias the subsequent results.
The first two colums of Table 3.3 show results of a linear probability model where
the dependent variable is a successful government intervention in the municipality,
i.e. the capture or elimination of a head of any DTO. Columns 3 and 4 report
results of an OLS on the number of successful captures.
The only variable that appears to be correlated with the intervention is the
male population. As the male population is encoded as a z-core, thus an increase
of one standard deviation in the number of males would lead to an increase of 0.24
(0.64) standard deviations in the probability of an intervention. As can be seen
above in Table 3.2, the standard deviation of male population in the aggregate is
very large, thus while the coefficient on male population is significant, but it very
small. In all, none of the municipality level variables available appear to explain
the intervention satisfactorily. Nonetheless, this exercise does not rule out other
factors that might have influenced the decision of the government to intervene in
a particular municipality at a particular time, it merely shows that none of the
variables used here do.
I am interested in the effect that the capture of a DTO head in a neighboring
municipality has on the DTO presence in a municipality with no previous DTO
presence, that is I want to estimate the following:
12The author thanks Caldero´n et al. (2015) for allowing the use of the data
13The author thanks Coscia and Rios (2012) for allowing the use of the data
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Table 3.3: What explains the intervention?
Any capture Nr. of captures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln (property crime) -0.00 -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male population 15-39 yo 0.24∗ 0.24∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.64∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.20) (0.20)
Per capita night lights -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Ln (tot. population) 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant -0.03 -0.00 0.63 0.67
(0.32) (0.32) (0.53) (0.54)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12199 12199 12199 12199
r2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
F 8.64 8.66 7.23 7.33
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered at the
municipality level. Year and municipality fixed effects. The crime in
columns 1 and 3 is theft, the crime in columns 2 and 4 is other property
crime. One municipality in 2010 is missing information on DTO presence,
thus the total number of observations is 12199 instead of 12200. The male
population was normalized to a z-score.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
DTOit = β1Capturej,t−1 + γX′i + νi + φt + ηit (3.1)
Equation (3.1) includes municipality fixed effects φt and year fixed effects νi.
Neighboring municipalities are indexed by j.
The dependent variables in Table 3.4 are the presence of any DTO in a mu-
nicipality in a given year (columns 1-3) and the number of DTO present in a
municipality in a given year (columns 4-6). Explanatory variables are different
measures of the state intervention: any capture, capture of a leader or a lieutenant,
or number of captures. To illustrate the relationship between the intervention and
the geographical expansion of the DTO, the sample is limited to municipalities
that had no DTO presence in the previous period.
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The results suggest that the capture of any DTO head in the immediate
vicinity of a municipality with no previous reported DTO presence will increase the
probability that a DTO is reported in that municipality in the next period by 8%.
There were a total of 76 successful interventions (i.e. intervened municipalities) in
the 5 years between 2006 and 2010. A total of 332 municipalities neighboring a
municipality with an intervention in the past period and with no previous DTO
presence displayed DTO presence in the year following the intervention. Thus,
on average, the state intervention is associated with 27 municipalities with DTO
presence. If one considers the capture of a DTO leader this number increases to 67.
Nonetheless, the issue of endogeneity remains unaddressed.
The results are also consistent with the argument that the kingpin strategy
led to a fractionalization of the DTO, as the capture of a leader in the vicinity
of a municipality is significantly and positively associated with an increase in the
number of DTO active in a municipality, as opposed as the capture of a lieutenant,
which has no statistical significance. The male population is significantly associated
with the presence and number of DTO in a municipality; as the variable is coded
as a z-score, an increase in one standard deviation in the number of males would
lead to an increase of approximately 3 to 5.4 standard deviations in either the
presence or the number of DTO in a municipality. A standard deviation increase
of the male population amounts to an increase three times the mean absolute value
and is thus practically unfeasible. Nonetheless, the results are consistent with the
literature on gender and crime (e.g.: Schwartz et al. (2009)).
3.4.2 DTO presence and crime
The potential effect of DTO on crime can be expressed by the following equation:
Crimeit = α + βDTOit + X
′
itγ + νi + φt + νit (3.2)
In Equation (3.2) the crime rate (Crimeit) is a function of the presence of a
DTO (βi), controlling for a vector of area attributes (X) such night light intensity
and gender composition of the population. Again, I include all possible and relevant
controls, as well as municipality and year fixed effects.
There are two subcategories of property crime: theft and other property crime.
The last one includes dispossession or illegal use of immobile property and damages
to third party property.
In Table 3.5 both measures of DTO presence, any DTO presence and the total
number of DTO active in a municipality, are associated with a negative change
in crime; although the coefficient on the DTO presence is not significant for theft.
This might be a problem if the already mentioned endogeneity between the DTO
71
3. THE GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSION OF DRUG CARTELS
AND PROPERTY CRIME IN MEXICO
presence and levels of crime.
3.4.3 State intervention and crime
To document the relationship between the state intervention, the DTO presence
and changes in property crime, I now use a two step approach where I use the
variation in DTO presence that can be attributed to the state intervention as an
explanatory variable in a regression of the log of crime for each type of property
crime. This is functionally equivalent to an instrumental variables estimation but
here it is only used to explore the channel from the state intervention via the
DTO presence to property crime without any ambition that this channel is purely
causal. Although the instrument can be shown to be relevant it is obviously not
possible to defend its exogeneity. The state intervention may affect property crime
in neighboring municipalities directly, if for instance it withdraws police forces from
the neighboring municipality to the municipality of the intervention. While the
state intervention is reported to be mostly a military one14, I am not aware of any
available data that would allow to control for police presence.
Both Tables, 3.6 and 3.7 use in their columns 1 and 2 the number of captures
in the past period in the immediate neighborhood of a municipality to instrument
for either the presence of any DTO or the number of DTO present in any given
municipality. Columns 3 and 4 of each Table report results where any capture in
the neighborhood of a municipality is used as an instrument for either the presence
of a DTO or the number of DTO active.
The results for other property crime, reported in Table 3.6, are partly in line
with the expectations: the coefficient on any measure of DTO presence is negatively
associated with property crime as well as statistically significant. As opposed to
Table 3.5, the variation in DTO presence exploited here is not the one directly
observed, but the one that can be statistically explained by the state intervention,
this means that while the coefficients reported here are much larger (ten or 30
times larger) and thus imply larger decreases in crime than the earlier reported
results, they do so only for that change in DTO presence than can be traced back
to the state intervention. The large size of the coefficients raises concerns about
the relevance of the used instrument, yet the F-statistic is well above the critical
value of 10.
Contrasting are the results of Table 3.7 which are not in line with the expecta-
tions: none of the coefficients of interest is statistically significant and they partly
have an unexpected sign. As in Table 3.5, there appears to be no relationship
between the DTO presence and theft. These results will be discussed later on.
A possible explanation for the lack of the statistical significance of the coefficients
14drug offenses in Mexico are a federal crime
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on theft as opposed to other property crime, provided the estimation is correct, lies
in the difference in the nature of both crimes. In contrast to theft, property crime
is an activity that mostly generates no income. Individuals engaged in property
crime could possible be absorbed (recruited) more easily by the DTO than those
engaged in theft, as they are probably easier to incentivize to join the DTO15 than
those who already have a source of income.
Regarding the magnitude of the coefficients in Table 3.6: the presence of any
DTO that can be explained though a successful intervention in the vicinity in the
past, is associated with −72.2%16 less property crime than in similar municipality
with no comparable DTO presence. This values is −84.3% in the case where the
DTO presence is explained through the number of captures instead of any successful
capture. The extent to which the number of DTO active in a municipality affects
crime can be gathered from columns (2) and (4). Here the number of DTO active
in a municipality in a period is explained by the number of capture or any capture
in a municipality in the neighborhood in the past period. Municipalities with an
increase of one DTO because of a successful intervention in the past will display
between 38% and 43% less property crime than similar municipalities without
an analogous increase in DTO presence. Unfortunately, this difference is difficult
to quantify in monetary terms as there is no information on the value of the
property lost or damaged in the data. The mean number of property crime per
100k population is 13.9 with a relatively large standard deviation more than double
the mean value. The decrease on the mean would be of between 5 to 11 property
crime cases per 100k population.
15This argumentation obviates any form of forced recruitment that most certainly goes on
16(exp(-1.28)-1)*100
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Table 3.4: DTO presence and state intervention
DTO presence (=1)(i,t) Nr. of DTO(i,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Any capture (=1) 0.08∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.05)
L.Leader’s capture (=1) 0.19∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(0.08) (0.15)
L.Lieutenant’s capture 0.04 0.05
(0.03) (0.03)
L.Number of captures 0.06∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
Pop. males 15-39 yo 2.95∗∗∗ 2.98∗∗∗ 2.94∗∗∗ 5.40∗∗∗ 5.45∗∗∗ 5.39∗∗∗
(0.83) (0.82) (0.84) (1.67) (1.65) (1.67)
Per capita night lights 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.30 0.32 0.31
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
ln(tot. population) -0.27∗∗ -0.27∗∗ -0.27∗∗ -0.41∗∗ -0.42∗∗ -0.41∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Constant 2.92∗∗∗ 2.96∗∗∗ 2.92∗∗∗ 4.65∗∗ 4.71∗∗ 4.64∗∗
(1.07) (1.06) (1.08) (1.89) (1.87) (1.90)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7865 7865 7865 7865 7865 7865
r2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
F 42.18 37.12 42.07 35.49 31.15 35.42
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered at the municipality level. Year
and municipality fixed effects. Sample has been limited to municipalities that had no DTO
presence in the previous period. One municipality is missing DTO presence information for the
year 2010.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: DTO presence and property crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Theft Theft Other Other
DTO (=1) -0.04 -0.06∗∗
(0.03) (0.02)
Nr. of DTO active -0.03∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Pop. males 15-39 yo 0.09 0.14 -0.03 0.06
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18)
Population density (per km2) 0.00∗ 0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Per capita night lights 9.94∗ 9.40∗ 30.06∗∗∗ 29.09∗∗∗
(5.66) (5.64) (6.29) (6.21)
Unemployment rate (yearly average) -0.02∗ -0.02 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 1.26∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12199 12199 12199 12199
F 3.47 3.81 18.45 19.23
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-sq. 0.146 0.176 0.151 0.079
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(crime). Standard errors in parentheses. Observations
clustered at the municipality level. Year and municipality fixed effects. One municipality is
missing DTO presence information for the year 2010. The unemployment rate is for the
federal state.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.5 Conclusion
In an effort to successfully curb the drug trafficking activity in Mexico, the gov-
ernment implemented a so-called kingpin strategy that aimed at the elimination
or capture of a the heads and lieutenants of the resident drug trafficking organiza-
tions, the DTO. There is ample literature showing that this policy had disastrous
unintended consequences as it generated an outburst of violence that left around
60000 death in 10 years.
This study concentrates on that same government intervention but aims to
analyze the relationship between the presence of drug trafficking organizations and
property crime. I argue that a DTO that arrives at a new geographical location will
aim to control that area as best as possible. To do so, it will subdue any existing
criminal cells, be it by coercing or coaxing. This will effectively reduce the amount
of property crime.
I use data on the number and the location of deaths and captures of DTO
leadears, as well as data on the presence of DTO and judicial crime data as well as
varios controls to analyze if the government intervention fostered the geographical
expansion of the DTO and if this expansion helps explain changes in theft and
other types of property crime.
I find that the a successful state intervention in a neighboring municipality
increases the probability of a municipality displaying DTO presence in the next
period. The state intervention also increases the number of DTO present. To better
document the relationship between the intervention, the DTO and property crime I
use the variation in DTO presence that can be attributed to the state intervention
to estimate changes in the two types of property crime.
The results suggest that DTO presence is negatively associated with changes in
property crime to the extent that property crime could be almost halved by the
presence of the DTO. The relationship does not hold for theft.
This analysis provides tentative evidence for another set of unintended conse-
quences, besides the violent ones, that can arise due to an aggressive government
intervention: changes in property crime. Such declines in property crime could be
misatributed or instrumentalized by a government and could so divert resources
away from deterrence and prevention of crime. This study put forth the argument
and supplied suggestive evidence, for the involvement of criminal organizations in
crime modalities that are not directly connected to their business. If the DTO
tax or even prohibit the exercise of certain, illegal, activities, they are de facto
substituting the state presence and undermining its monopoly on regulations.
It is unclear if once the DTO “leaves” an area, be it because it moves on or
because it ceases to exist, the existing criminals, no longer subdued, will retake
their previous activities, particularly if the state presence is not active fast enough.
A case where the cessation of activities of an organized crime organization coincided
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with an increase in property and other crimes can be seen in Colombia. After the
United Self-Defenses of Colombia demobilized in 2006 reports of band of criminals
spiked. As is the case with non-experimental settings, the successful estimation of a
causal relationship is very difficult and requires a great deal of data and ingenuity.
The nature of organized crime and drug trafficking organizations itself makes it
very difficult to have accurate measures of their presence. An organization might
have been active in a given municipality or area for an unknown amount of time
before it appears in the data. Furthermore the limited availability and quality of
committed crime data continues to be a concern as is the involvement of the police
itself in reporting or the presence of gangs, for which I cannot account.
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4Nutritional Impacts of Price
Changes: Quality and Quantity
Substitution in Mexico
4.1 Introduction
Both the epidemiological transition (the replacement of infectious disease morbidity
by non-communicable chronic diseases (NC-CD) in a society) and the nutrition
transition (the shift in dietary preferences from cereals and fiber to animal products
and fat in a society) are currently underway in Mexico although not at similar speeds;
the nutrition transition appears to be faster (Rivera et al., 2004; Popkin, 1993)
as it goes faster through its different stages. Both have been linked to changes in
the food consumption patterns and dietary intake as well as with reduced physical
activity. The long term costs if this development continues can be high: as of
2013, an estimated 75% of deaths in Mexico are caused by NC-CD, with projected
healthcare costs of more than US$1 billion in 2021 (Barquera et al., 2013).
An added complication to the situation is that both shifts are not homogeneous
throughout the country, with the north having a higher incidence of NC-CD and
the nutritional patterns of a developed country, as opposed to the south (Romieu
et al., 1997; Rivera et al., 2002). Moreover, the different stages of the nutrition
and epidemiological transition can appear at the same time, for example, Romieu
et al. (1997) reports the concomitant existence of obesity in women and stunting in
children in certain southern Mexican states, with newer studies, such as Barquera
et al. (2013) , confirming that undernutrition and obesity coexist, even in the
same individual (e.g.: obesity and iron deficiency). Moreover, Rivera et al. (2004)
note that the sum of overweight and obesity appear to decline as socioeconomic
conditions improve, suggesting that poor individuals are, and will be, bearing the
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medical and economic brunt of these transitions. The evolution of changes in
dietary intake, medical conditions and of disease can be worsened by other risk
factors, namely the low levels of leisure time dedicated to physical activity reported
in the low socioeconomic categories in Mexico. Furthermore, obesity appears to be
increasing faster in children than in adults (Barquera et al., 2013).
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of the “sugar tax” on household
food consumption and their nutrition patterns with a particular focus on quantity
and quality substitution effects in Mexico. To do so I extend the approach of
McKelvey (2011); Andalon and Gibson (2017) to compute quality adjusted nutrient
elasticities in the manner of Ecker and Qaim (2011).
In particular I use household food expenditure data from two waves of a
representative household survey as well a official prices in a pseudo-panel approach to
calculate the corresponding elasticities and thus assert the caloric and macronutrient
intake change that is possible with an increase in the prices of sugar-added beverages.
There appears to be a very strong link between the nutritional and the epidemi-
ological transitions: Rivera et al. (2004) report that between the years of 1988 and
1999 in Mexico the amount of food quantities purchased declined but also that the
composition of the food bought changed: the purchase of refined carbohydrates
and soda increased by 6.3% and 37.2% respectively while the purchases of fruits
and vegetables declined by approximately 30%. For the same 11-year time span,
the authors report on the increase in the prevalence of overweight and obesity1 in
Mexico. The national prevalence of overweight increased by almost 47% and that
of obesity by 160%. Colchero et al. (2016) report a prevalence of overweight and
obesity of more than 33% for individuals between the ages of 2 and 18 and of 70%
for adults. Despite efforts to control the incidence of both medical conditions, as of
2013 no decline was observed (Barquera et al., 2013).
Changes in NC-CD mirror the evolution in dietary preferences and that of
overweight and obesity. The increases in age-adjusted mortality rates for diabetes,
acute myocardial infarction and hypertension for the same 11-year span reported
by Rivera et al. (2004) amount to 62%, 53% and 55% respectively. Colchero
et al. (2016) report that the prevalence of diabetes in Mexico is the highest of the
OECD countries.
Studies (Powell et al. (2013); Malik et al. (2006)) suggests that added sugar
in beverages is linked with overweight, obesity, and derived heart and metabolic
diseases such as diabetes, as the caloric intake from liquids does not appear to
cause satiation in humans and thus leads to an overconsumption2. Caloric intake
1The WHO defines an adult as overweight if its BMI is larger than or equal to 25 and as
obese if its BMI is larger than or equal to 30. The BMI is defines as a persones weight in
kilograms devided by the square of the height im meters (http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
factsheets/fs311/en/ last accessed May 5, 2017).
2The reason appears to be that in humans the sugars or the calories from liquid beverages
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from beverages accounts for about 20% in Mexico, one of the highest in the world.
Also, the consumption of caloric beverages increased more than 200% between 1990
and 2006 (Barquera et al., 2013). Any reduction in the consumption of beverages
with added sugar would probably go a long way in reducing overweight and obesity
and so its associated NC-CD, provided, the reduction in the consumption of those
beverages does lead to a reduction in calorie intake and does not have any adverse
nutritional effects.
An idea (Fletcher et al., 2010) of reducing the consumption of sugar, fat, and
refined carbohydrates are excise taxes. These “obesity taxes” mirror in its aim and
implementation other taxes for controlled substances, for example tobacco. In the
case of the latter it has been implemented with small but non-negligible success
in curbing consumption and even more success in increasing tax revenues. In the
case of soft drink taxes, there is limited evidence, at least for adults (Fletcher et
al., 2010), that such a tax reduces the amount of consumed calories from soft drinks.
A concern that arises with the proposal of such a tax are possible substitution
effects: it is unclear if a tax that reduces the consumption of soda will also reduce
the calorie intake or whether individuals will increase the consumption of non-taxed
items of a similar caloric content in response to the tax. In a study with data from
the United States, Fletcher et al. (2010) show that a soft drink tax does reduce the
amount (but no the probability) of soft drinks consumed, but that the reduction in
caloric intake is completely offset by the consumption of other drinks with similar
caloric content, for example juices.
Mexico introduced a “sugar tax” the 1st of January 2014 of 1 MXN/L on non-
diary, non-alcoholic beverages with added sugar, the so called sodas or “refrescos”
(approximately a 10% price increase to the previous year) as well as an add-
valorem tax increase from 5% to 8% on a pre-defined list of non-essential food
items with high energy density3 (Colchero et al., 2016). This tax is one of several
steps undertaken by the government to combat obesity, overweight, and NC-CD
(Barquera et al., 2013).
In an effort to explain the rapid rise of non-communicable chronic diseases (NC-
CD) and obesity in Mexico between 1980 and 1998, Rivera et al. (2002) characterize
the epidemiological and nutritional transitions, but are unsuccessful in establishing
a link between the NC-CD and dietary changes. They posit that:“although unlikely,
it could be that people spent less money but purchased larger amounts of cheaper
food [...].” Other studies, such as Fletcher et al. (2010), provide first evidence of
do not limit the intake from calories from non-liquid foods, i.e. caloric beverages do not cause
satiation in a human the way solid food does. Thus drinking calories leads to an energy surplus.
The mechanism is unknown but it is theorized that humans lack genetic markers that would
triggers a satiation response (Wolf et al., 2008).
3High energy dense are those foods that contain more than 275 calories (1151kJ) per 100
gram.
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substitution effects between goods in the case of a price increase (e.g.: through
”obesity taxes”), a so-called quantity substitution. But there is little evidence
regarding the substitution along the same type of goods. In a observational study
of the Mexican “sugar tax”, Colchero et al. (2016) report that there was a reduction
in purchases of sweetened beverages, but that the reductions were larger for non-
carbonated beverages than for carbonated ones. The authors hypothesize that
the comparably low decreases in the consumption of carbonated beverages after
the tax could be due to consumers substituting to lower priced versions, i.e. that
the consumers would be engaging in quality substitution. McKelvey (2011) sets
up a framework to identify quantity and quality substitution using unit values
and prices to obtain price elasticities of quantity and quality. Unit values (the
ratio of expenditures to quantity) are extracted from a household survey, while
prices are obtained from official government sources. The author analyses rice
consumption in Indonesia and finds that quality substitution is prevalent. Similarly,
Gibson and Kim (2013) analyze the effect of increased prices on calorie intake
from rice in VietNam and find that ignoring quality substitution would lead to
a gross overestimation of the reductions in calorie intake from rice. For Mexico,
Andalon and Gibson (2017) provide suggestive evidence on the biases in the price
elasticity of quantity that arise from computations using solely the unit values.
Their estimates show that a quality corrected price elasticities of quantity for
sugared beverages in Mexico is actually up to a third smaller than expected and
that the associated reduction in quantity would not be nearly enough to produce
large enough changes in weight. Nonetheless, the estimates they obtained were
computed with a household survey from 2014 that was conducted months after
the introduction of the tax and after the individuals have had time to adapt
their consumption patterns. I improve on that study by providing a pseudo-panel
estimate where time invariant parameters have been taking into account using data
from before the introduction of the tax, and by providing estimates of nutritional
changes.
The contribution of this study is manifold: it provides for the first time esti-
mates on the quality corrected price elasticity of quantity for various nutrients.
Furthermore, this study also contextualizes the findings by providing an assessment
of changes in the nutritional patterns in a country with a varied diet: Mexico.
I find that in the case of soda the use of prices as opposed to unit values
leads to biased estimates of the price elasticity of quantity. In particular, quality
substitution can offset almost completely any price effects. Furthermore, households
at lower levels of food expenditure, and with lower levels of soda consumption, are
those that will bear most of the tax, as they do not have much room to engage in
quality substitution. Conversely, households with higher levels of food expenditure
and also higher levels of soda consumption will be less affected. I compare prices,
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quantities and unit values of soda between 2012 and 2014 and find that prices
increased overproportionally, quantity consumed showed almost no change and unit
values increased overproportionally for those households that appear to be unable
to engage in quality substitution.
4.2 Concept
I begin by highlighting the implications of using unit values to assess price elasticities
drawing from McKelvey (2011) and then I describe the computation of nutritional
elasticities from quality adjusted price elasticities of quantity.
Total expenditure xi for a commodity group i is the product of price pi and
quantity qi:
xi = pi · qi (4.1)
where pi and qi are vectors for the price and quantity of each element of the
group i. For example a commodity group could be ”beef” and its components
would then be steak, brisket, sirloin, and any other cuts.
The price vector (pi) can be decomposed in to a scalar λi that captures a
component that is common to all prices in that price vector and a vector for the
relative prices withing the group p∗i . By expanding the RHS of Equation (4.1) by
Qi
Qi
with Qi being the sum of each component of qi in a group, the total expenditures
can be written as
xi = λi
p∗i · qi
Qi
Qi (4.2)
In Equation (4.2) the element vi =
p∗i ·qi
Qi
is the measure of quality for the
consumption of of group i because if the relative prices p∗i are constant, but the
level of vi for a consumer is larger than for another it must be because the first one
has chosen qi in a manner in which he is spending more per unit than the second
consumer. Thus, higher expenditures for one and the same item indicate higher
quality 4.
The usually used unit value of a group is a ratio of expenditures to quantity:
4As in McKelvey (2011) the assumption of constant relative prices is paramount to the
estimation and inference of the elasticities and I will not deviate from it here.
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Vi =
xi
Qi
(4.3)
Thus, using Equation (4.2) one can rewrite Equation (4.3) as:
Vi = λi · vi
Changes in the unit value can not only occur due to changes in the common
component of the price λi but also due to changes in the quality vi chosen by the
consumer.
The assessment of changes in quantity due to a changes in prices occurs through
the price elasticities of quantity. A standard method for estimating the price
elasticity involves the regression of expenditure shares for each commodity group
in a demand system on the corresponding unit value.
This method implies that once a price changes, the consumer will change the
quantity of the good consumed, for example by switching to the consumption of a
substitute. This might be the case for very narrowly defined consumption goods,
for example a single brand of a food staple, but is unlikely to be the case for broader
groups of items, for example sugared beverages, as the consumer might as well
change to cheaper varieties of the same good.
As a possible solution to account for quality substitution between items in
a group in the absence of market prices, Deaton (1988) proposes to exploit the
assumption of weak separability of commodity groups; but as McKelvey (2011)
and Andalon and Gibson (2017) show, this assumption does not appear to hold.
To be able to account for quality substitution in the case where market prices
and unit values are available one needs two different equations.
whit = α1 + β1lnxht + γ1zht + θ1lnλht + u1hit (4.4)
In Equation (4.4) the expenditure share w for a household h for a commodity
group i at time t is regressed on the total expenditures of the household for all the
goods in the demand system lnxht, a vector of household characteristics zht and a
vector of all the prices in the demand system λt. The inclusion of all prices in the
demand system is to account for possible cross-price substitution.
In what follows I suppress the time index t for legibility. Deriving the expression
in Equation (4.4) with respect to the price of good i, accounting for the quantities
Qi =
whixh
Vi
, and noting that
∂lnx
∂lnλi
= 0 yields:
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∂lnQi
∂lnλi
=
∂ln(whi)
∂lnλi
− ∂lnVi
∂lnλi
(4.5)
Equation (4.5) allows for the estimation of the quality adjusted price elasticity
of quantity. It adjusts the elasticity in the expenditure share changes in unit values
that occur through changes in prices. The regression (4.4) accounts for all other
items in the demand systems besides i as they are included in the price vector
λt, but cross-price effects are not shown in Equation (4.5). They are derived
analogously and will be of interest later on.
To see the quality substitution note that:
∂lnQi
∂lnλi
=
∂ln(whi)
∂lnλi
− ∂λi
∂λi
− ∂lnvi
∂λi
(4.6)
If the elasticiy of quality to price is zero
(
∂lnvi
∂λi
= 0
)
then Equation (4.8) turns
into:
1i =
∂lnQi
∂lnλi
=
∂ln(whi,t)
∂lnλi
− 1
The elasticity of quantity to price can be then be obtained from a regression of
Equation (4.4), where θ1i is the coefficient of interest
5.
If one allows for quality substitution, then the second term on the LHS of
Equation (4.5) can be obtained from a regression of unit values on the prices:
lnVhi = α2 + β2lnxh + γ2zh + θ2lnλt + u2hi (4.7)
As does Equation (4.5), Equation (4.7) includes controls for the prices of
all goods present in the demand system. Of initial interest are only the direct
elasticities, and the coefficient of interest will be θ2i.
Two further points need to be mentioned concerning the estimation of quality
adjusted price elasticities of quantity. The price elasticity of quantity can be
obtained without having to account for any quality substitution effects if both
quantities consumed and prices are observed, as I do. In that case, one would only
need to replace expenditure share whi,t with quantities consumed in Equation (4.4).
5This would be the direct elasticity, elasticities of substitution can be computed analogously
(McKelvey, 2011).
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But as one of the main aims of the study is to compute, show and contextualize the
quantity of substitution, I will compute the unadjusted and the unadjusted price
elasticities. The second point refers to the comparability of the results with previous
analyses. The two studies that are the closest to this one are McKelvey (2011), for
the methodology, and Andalon and Gibson (2017) as they study the same price
change as is done in this study. In both cases the authors implement a measurement
error correction in the method presented here that aims a reducing the differences
to other methods presented there.
2i =
∂lnQi
∂lnλi
=
∂w
∂λi
w
− ∂lnVi
∂lnλi
(4.8)
In those previous studies, the first term in Equation (4.8) (
∂w
∂λi
w
) has been modified
to control for a possible spurious correlation in a regression of the expenditure
shares on the unit values as the total expenditures appear in the denominators of
both the dependent variable and the independent variable of interest (Andalon and
Gibson, 2017; McKelvey, 2011). This correction is not needed in cases when there
is no comparison across methods and will therefore not be implemented here6.
The adjusted and the unadjusted price elasticities of quantity will only differ if
∂lnvi
∂lnλi
= 0, that is, in cases where there is no quality substitution. This might be
the case for very narrownly defined commodity groups or those that are comprised
of a single item, for example maize tortillas.
As for the nutritional elasticities I employ the approach taken by Ecker and
Qaim (2011)7, Huang (1996) and Huang and Lin (2000) in their studies of price
and income changes and nutritional impacts. Especially in the case of a single price
change this approach allows to derive changes in the nutritional impacts associated
with it. The approach is not very well suited to analyze simultaneous changes in
prices for different items.
The nutrient elasticities to food prices are calculated as follows:
eiN =
∑
j cjNqjeij∑
j cjNqj
,
where cjN is the quantity of nutrient N present in one unit of food item j, qj is
6The correction was first introduced by Deaton (1988) in a setting were only unit values were
available.
7Which in turn has its roots in Pitt (1983) and Sahn (1988).
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the quantity of food item j consumed, and eij is the price elasticity of food item
i due to price changes in j. Thus the ejN are the weighted average of all price
elasticities eij, where each weight is the share of the nutritional content of each
food to the overall nutrient consumption.
Empirically, I use a pseudo panel approach (Verbeek, 2008; Verbeek and
Vella, 2005; Deaton, 1985) using two subsequent waves of the Mexican National
Income and Expenditure Household Survey8. A pseudo-panel is less likely to suffer
from attrition and the computation of cohort means diminishes the measurement
error in the variables of interest (Gardes et al., 2005). To obtain the best results
cohorts have to be carefully constructed. Ideally, the choice of cohort will be so that
the heterogeneity within cohort is minimized and the heterogeneity between cohorts
is maximized. Additionally, the usage of cohorts in pseudo-panels is an application
of instrumental variables and as such requires that the standard instrumental
variables approach conditions are met, i.e., relevance and exogeneity (Verbeek and
Vella, 2005). Furthermore, the aggregation process through which the cohorts are
created produces systematic heteroscedasticity that needs to be corrected without
eliminating the invariance of the cohort over time (Gardes et al., 2005).
With this approach, and based on Equations (4.4) and (4.7), the estimated
model is then given by:
w¯cti = α1ct + β1lnx¯ct + γ1zct + θ1lnλ¯ct + ucti, c = 1, . . . , C; t = 1, . . . , T,
For cohort c, commodity group i and time period t, and cohort average ex-
penditure shares(w¯c), food expenditures (x¯c) and a vector of food prices (λ¯c). zc
is a vector of cohort level controls. Contingent on a sufficiently large number of
observations per cohort, αct can be viewed as a time invariant fixed unobserved
parameter. In that case the θ1 are the within estimator on the pseudo panel.
The next regression is estimated to compute the quality adjusted elasticities of
quantity:
lnV¯cit = α2ct + β2lnx¯ct + γ2zct + θ2lnλ¯ct + vcit, c = 1, . . . , C; t = 1, . . . , T,
The unadjusted price elasticity for a good i given changes in the price of good
j is then:
1i =
θ1i
w¯cti
− 1,
8ENIGH by its initials in Spanish.
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and the quality adjusted price elasticity for good i is:
2i =
θ1i
w¯cti
− θ2i.
The data sources and descriptive statistics thereof are detailed as follows in
Section 4.3.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Food expenditures and quantities
Food expenditure data comes from the Mexican Income and Expenditure Survey9 for
the years 2010 and 2012. These surveys were selected because they were conducted
before the tax was introduced. This ensures that the computed elasticities are not
affected by any adaptation of the consumers to the new tax10.
To account for the household size I use adult equivalence scales to compute
per capita food expenditures. The individual adult equivalence scales used here
are those developed by Teruel et al. (2005)11 for Mexico using the ENIGH 200212.
Adult equivalents are used to computed adjusted per capita total expenditures for
each household.
A point of concern regarding the use of a household survey to identify food
consumption patterns is the seasonal availability of certain products, particularly
if these products are predominantly consumed by a specific socio-economic group.
The 2012 household survey was levied between the 27 August and the 24 November.
The items of consideration here are available all year, as they are not seasonal
products. As for seasonal preferences, Mexico has no clearly defined seasons but a
“rainy” and a “dry” seasons, the onset of which varies according to the area.
Another point of concern if that quantities purchased are not necessary quantities
consumed and that the nutritional content of food will change due to cooking. In
the first case, the FAO (2015); FAO (2014) estimates that the average national
food waste in Mexico amounts to 37, 26% of total production. Out of the total
number of calories wasted, 30% of losses occur at the consumption stage of the
9ENIGH by its name in Spanish
10Andalon and Gibson (2017) in a study with a similar focus use data levied after the
introduction of the tax.
11Note that the scales were developed with different methods. I use here the one developed
with the method of Engel and then only the values obtained at the median of the distribution
which diverge slightly at the third decimal place from those at the mean.
12The equivalence scales are as follows: for ages 0 to 5: 0.64, for ages 6 to 12: 0.67, for ages 13
to 18: 0.63, for ages 19 to 65: 0.84. Individuals aged 66 and older are weighted with one.
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food supply chain13 as much as in the production stage. Not all products produced
in Mexico are wasted in the same proportion, with guava (57,73%), cow milk
(57,14%), mango (54,54%) and fish and sardines (54,07%) taking up the first four
spots. Another issue with food waste, is that is probably most salient in higher
income brackets than in lower ones. As the household surveys offer no measure of
control for actually consumed food, the interpretation of results should bear this in
mind. Nonetheless, soda, which is the commodity of interest here, does not appear
in any account of food waste that I was able to revise.
With regards to the nutritional content, the items of interest in this study are
not usually cooked14. Nonetheless, there can be differences in macronutrient or
energetic content between brands of the same commodity goods. In the case of
sugar-added beverages this difference is negligible. For example, the difference
between 368ml of Coca Cola and 368ml of Jarritos Mexican Cola is just one calorie.
This difference might be more salient for close substitutes of soda beverages, for
example milk. In the household surveys it is not reported if the milk bought had
lowered fat content. This is an issue regarding the amount of final calories, but
not regarding the final amount of sugar. For example, skimmed milk (with a fat
content of 1,5%) has around 1970 kilo calories per 1 liter, while whole milk (with a
fat content of 3,5%) has approximately 2720 kilo calories per liter. Both types of
milk have the same amount of sugar though, around 48 grams per liter.
4.3.2 Cohorts
The households are grouped into cohorts which are determined by the region15, the
rural status16 of the municipality in which the household is located, as well as the
economic sector in which the household head is active17.
Verbeek (2008) puts forward the argument that estimation techniques that are
based on the grouping of individual observations into cohorts are equal to those
used in instrumental variable approaches. In particular this means that the cohorts
13This is an average for all Latin America
14Boiling milk does not alter its nutritional content.
15There are four different regions: The North includes Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua,
Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. The North-Center region includes Aguascalientes, Baja
California Sur, Colima, Durango, Jalisco Michoaca´n, Nayarit, San Luis Potos´ı, Sinaloa y Zacatecas.
The Center includes Distrito Federal, Estado de Me´xico, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla,
Quere´taro and Tlaxcala. The South region includes Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca,
Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz and Yucata´n.
16According to the Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography a municipality is
labeled as rural if the number of inhabitants lies below 2500 indivuals.
17In case the household head engaged in more than one activity, the primary activity was
chosen. Economic sectors are: agriculture, mining, energy and construction, industry, commerce,
services, government and other. Also, unemployed household heads have an own category.
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should be relevant with regards to the main explanatory variable(s).
In the case discussed in this study, the explanatory variables of interest are
the unit values and the prices of soda. Table 4.1 reports the correlations between
the cohorts and these variables of interest. As will be discussed below, there is no
statistical association between unit values and prices. In contrast the correlation
between the cohorts and the aforementioned unit values and prices is significant
and negative. With these results I go forward and present summary statistics for
the cohorts.
Table 4.1: Correlations
Cohort Price (soda) Unit value (soda)
Cohort 1.0000
Price (soda) -0.4118* 1.0000
(0.0000)
Unit value (soda) -0.4401* -0.0794 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.4055)
Notes: This table reports Pearson’s correlations calculated with analytical
weights to control for the number of households in each cohort. Significance
levels are in parentheses. (*) indicates a significance level at the 5%.
Table 4.2 summarizes some key characteristics of the cohorts and the consump-
tion profiles of the commodity groups used in the main analysis. Notable are the
strong differences in household numbers that are present in each cohort. To avoid
any distortion of the results, appropriate weights are used in the statistical analysis.
Means are build over the years 2010 and 2012, in the case of consumption variabes
the means refers to weekly consumption. The food expenditure shares of soda in
the data lie between 5% and 17%, with a total amount of soda bought that lies
between 3 and 7 liters, closely followed by water. For comparison, the average food
expenditure share of tortillas, a main food staple, lies between 7% and 21% of the
food expenditure in a week. This goes to show that soda is a prominent food item.
4.3.3 Unit prices & unit values
Prices used here are those levied for several items representative of a set of products
each month in 46 different municipalities, called price stations, and published by
the INEGI18. I match each municipality in the country to a price station by the
shortest geodesic distance between the municipality centroids and match each
household to a price by the month in which the household was interviewed. If the
18Until 2011, the prices were levied and published by the Mexican Central Bank.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics
Mean SD Min. Max.
Cohort characteristics
Households (Nr. in cohort) 814.489 633.515 11 2108
Food expenditures (MXN) 449.154 72.228 290.269 596.504
Share of males (%) 0.752 0.171 0.430 1
Share of indigenous households (%) 0.302 0.173 0.056 0.781
Nr. adult equivalents 3.047 1.446 0.630 15.330
Nr. household individuals 3.886 1.972 1 21
Weekly expenditure shares (%)
Soda 0.088 0.018 0.050 0.176
Water 0.059 0.010 0.031 0.161
Milk 0.097 0.014 0.057 0.154
Chips and similar 0.029 0.006 0.011 0.064
Weekly quantities (liter or kilogram)
Soda 5.144 0.597 3.262 7.249
Water 31.402 5.867 12.250 91.200
Milk 3.920 0.835 1.872 5.686
Chips and similar 0.323 0.227 0.125 3.220
Notes: Summary statistics for 56 cohorts in each of two waves of the ENIGH, with a total
of 36074 households. Consumption variables are weekly means. Expenditures shares are
shares of total food expenditures. Quantities and shares are reported for one week (7 days).
Quantities are in liter or kilogram. Share of males includes underage individuals. A household
is reported as indigenous if the household head ascribes to an indigenous community or if
their mother language is an indigenous one. Adult equivalents were computed using the scales
from Teruel et al. (2005).The food expenditures of each household were deflated with the
corresponding CPI of the month and year in which the household was interviewed. The base
is the the second quarter of 2010.
interview took place in a week in which one month ended and another started I
take the average of the prices of both months.
Unit values are extracted from expenditure and quantity information. Unlike
prices, not all households observe an unit value as not all households consume all
available goods. To be able to account for unit values in the same manner as I
account for prices, the missing unit values have been imputed. To do so I look for
the median of the unit value in question at the same expenditure decile in either the
same municipality, neighboring municipalities, or finally, the federal state. Having
a complete set of prices and unit values allows me to create a complete matrix of
own- and cross-price elasticities.
To motivate the emphasis put on the difference between unit values and prices
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and thus, on quality substitution, I explore the extent of quality substitution. If
unit values accurately reflected price changes, then a doubling of prices would result
in a doubling of unit values.
Figure 4.1 plots the unit values against the prices of soda, the commodity group
of interest.
Figure 4.1: Prices and unit values are natural logarithms of cohort means
The prices lie below the 45 degree reference line and the linear fit shows a
miniscule positive association between prices and unit values. In this particular
case, using unit values as a proxy for prices in a regression meant to identify the
price elasticites would lead to biased estimates.
The reasons for the difference between unit values and prices remains. The
official prices are the average of the prices levied by the government. Included
are several instances of major brand such as Coca-Cola as well as beverages from
the same “brand family”: Fanta, Sprite and Lift. Underrepresented brands in the
offical list include Pen˜afiel, Jarritos, Sidral Mundet, Manzanita Sol and Mirinda.
Although only one of these (Jarritos) is owned by a Mexican company, three of them
(Pen˜afiel, Sidral Mundet and Manzanita Sol) were originally of Mexican ownership,
now owned by international conglomerates. The difference in prices between brands
in this particular commodity group can be considerable. For example, in February
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2011, in the price station of Acapulco, a liter of Jarritos had a price of 3.84 MXN
and one of Coca Cola one of 13 MXN19. The difference between prices and unit
values illustrated in Figure 4.1 can be explained if the officially levied prices do not
accurately mirror the average composition of the soda basket of each household. To
corroborate such claim, I would need access to the detailed entries of the household
surveys, which are not reported. Nevertheless, the distance in prices for such close
substitutes, which are also reported in the same commodity group in the household
surveys, offers ample room for substitution.
4.3.4 Commodity groups & nutritional content
The household surveys report information on commodity groups which in turn
are comprised of commodity items. For example the commodity group soda is
comprised of different brands of soda. The INEGI20 report prices for different
commodity items21 and also a key to match items to groups. Thus, there is an
unequivocal assignment between both sources of data.
To obtain nutritional values for each commodity group, nutritional data for
each was compiled from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)22.
Please note that the nutritional content reported here does not refer solely to
macronutrients as calories are not a nutrient per se but a measure of energy and that
humans derive their energy from lipids, carbohydrates and proteins. Furthermore,
carbohydrates are compounds of complex and simple sugars but simple sugar is
reported separately. For simplicity, going forward I refer to “nutritional content”
to the compendium of elements presented here.
Table 4.3 reports the nutritional content of sodas as well as two possible
substitutes and chips. The nutritional elements of interest are presented in the first
four columns with a selection of chemical elements in the last four.
Reported nutritional content can vary widely between official tables even for the
same good, and this is surely the case for cooked food and for agricultural produce.
As discussed above, in the case of industrially produced food, and particularly
for soda, this is not the case. Nonetheless, this is the case for chips and similar,
particularly with regards to the caloric content. This is a result of the wide variety
of what in Mexico is called botanas, i.e. snacks and which can include potato chips
as well as fried belly pork or maize treats. To avoid a distortion of the nutritional
elasticities, the values reported here constitute a lower bound23.
19This information was gathered from the indivual entries published the fourth of March 2011
in the DOF (Diario Oficial de la Nacion or Official Journal of the Nation).
20Or the Mexican Central Bank, depending on the year
21The aforementioned different brands.
22https://www.usda.gov/
23A kilogram of potato chips can have up to 4000 kilo calories.
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Table 4.3: Nutritional values
Commodity group Calories Protein Lipids Carbohydrates Sugar Na Fe Mg K
Milk 640 32.8 36.6 46.5 48 490 .5 130 1510
Soda 480 0 0 120 120 30 0 0 0
Bottled water 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 20 0
Chips and similar 1330 21.9 33.9 235.1 2 3170 6.5 210 4000
Notes: Values for a liter or kilogram. Calories are kilo calories. Proteins, lipids, carbohydrates, and
sugar are reported in grams. Na (sodium), Fe (iron), Mg (magnesium) and K (potassium) are reported in
milligrams.
4.3.5 Consumption of sodas
Soda intake has been an increasing concern in Mexico. In the last 20 years, the
intake per capita has trippled and the number of households that report consuming
soda regularly increased in the same time span, by circa 20 percentage points to
around 70%. This increase in the consumption of soda does not appear to follow a
regular trend as the overall energy intake from non-beverages does not appear to
have changed (Barquera et al., 2008).
Figure 4.2 shows the mean quantity of liters and calories consumed per week
acroos the food expenditure distribution.
At the upper end of the food expenditures the soda consumption alone accounts
for 3500 kcal. Replacing that amount of soda with a non-caloric alternative, for
example water, would lead to a weight loss of about 500 grams of fat in a person
in a week. It is clear that achieving meaningful a reduction in calorie intake from
sodas will be much easier at the higher levels of consumption that at lower levels,
as a percentual reduction at lower levels translates to much smaller absolute values.
A concern going forward can be the possible relationship betwen unit values
and quantity or total food expenditures. Households could buy in bulk because
it is cheaper. Then unit value would not correctly reflect a quality decision but
an economic one. Simultaneously, poorer households, those with lower absolute
expenditures for food, might not be able to afford to buy in bulk. Unit values in
that case will not reflect a quality decision, either.
As Figure 4.3 shows, there is no apparent relationship between unit value and
quantity bought or unit value and food expenditures.
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Figure 4.2: Quantity, calorie intake, and food expenditures
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Figure 4.3: Unit values, soda quantity, and food expenditures
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4.4 Results
The price elasticities in Figure 4.4 were obtained by weighting each cohort with
the square root of the number of households of which it is comprised and by
including the prices for bottled water, milk, and chips as controls. The share
of male individuals and the share of indigenous population in each cohort were
included as further controls. The quality elasticity is computed as an average for
all cohorts, for that reason the slope of both graphs is the same.
Figure 4.4: Price elasticites of soda
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Notes: Note that the vertical axes are of the same length but are not in the same range.
The unadjusted elasticity lies just beneath −1 which is consistent with the
literature on elasticities of sugar-added beverages (Andreyeva et al., 2010). Co-
horts with higher food expenditures have larger (negative) elasticities. This price
sensitivity might arise from larger substitution possibilities. The magnitude of
the difference does not appear to be very large: the smallest value is −1.33 and
the largest −1.09324. With an average consumption of 5 liters of soda, a price
increase of 1% would lead to decreases in consumption of 66.5 and 54.65 milliliter,
respectively.
24Rounded to the third decimal.
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As expected, price increases are negatively associated with changes in unit
value. In the case of soda (Figure 4.4), these changes are large enough to offset
any changes in expenditure share associated with the price changes. The quality
substitution is large enough to yield positive price elasticities of quantity, albeit the
resulting elasticity is smaller than one. This undeproportional quantity increase
associated with price increases grows smaller the larger the mean food expenditure
of the cohort ist. While the quality elasticity is the same for all cohorts, cohort
at the upper end of the spectrum appear so to be less affected, or less inclined,
to substitute out of their prefered quality, as opposed to those at the lower end
of the spectrum. Again, this might be a reflection of the available substitution
posibilities.
Cohorts with lower food expenditures are less prone to engage in quality
substitution. As indicated before, unit values and food expenditures are not related
but as can be seen in Figure 4.5, cohorts with lower unit values, i.e. those that
already consume at lower quality levels, have the lowest quality adjusted elasticities.
If quality is a ladder, those that consume at very low quality levels figuratively
cannot step any lower. Hence, a tax on sodas will record the largest impact in
these households, as they are unable to quality-substitute away.
Figure 4.5: Quality adjusted elasticity and unit value
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The large extent of quality substitution presented here has implications for
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the efficiency and efficacy of the sugar tax in Mexico. This tax meant an average
increase of around 10% per liter of soda. As Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show, the projected
effect would be a modest change in sugar and calorie intake. As expected, the
reduction is larger at higher levels of expenditure, as these are the cohorts with
the largest consumption. The tax would lead to a reduction in the calorie intake
between 200 and 400 calories on average in a cohort in a week.
Figure 4.6: Calorie intake change with a 10% tax on soda
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Sugar intake would be reduced by around 50 grams on average in a cohort in a
week. That is a reduction of about two table spoons of sugar.
These results are not particularly large, and it is doubtful that they alone would
lead to meaningful changes in the prevalence of NC-CD. Not discussed are possible
changes in consumption patterns and preferences that could lead to a long term
reduction of sugar and calorie intake.
The results that take into account the quality substitution, presented in the
right panel of each Figure, show a reversal of the modest results of a sugar tax.
In both cases, calorie and sugar intake, the results are positive across the food
expenditure distribution. Furthermore, due to the low magnitude of the quality
corrected price elasticities, the absolute changes in calories and sugar intake turn
out very small and the relationship between the magnitude of the absolute changes
and food expenditures is no longer present.
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Figure 4.7: Sugar intake changes with a 10% tax on suda
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Average nutritional price elasticities of soda are presented in Table 4.4. Because
these elasticities are based on the price elasticities discussed above, these nutritional
elasticities include cross-price effects. Regarding their magnitude, we observe the
same behaviour as before. Nutritional elasticities differ greatly between quality
adjusted and unadjusted. With quality correction, the nutritional elasticites are
reduced to a third of the unadjusted values and in the case of sugar, are positive,
albeit very small.
Table 4.4: Adjusted and unadjusted nutritional elasticities
Calories Proteins Lipids Carbohydrates Sugar Na Fe Mg K
Adjusted
Mean -0.346 -0.401 -0.402 0.156 0.279 -0.374 -0.407 -0.239 -0.403
SD 0.094 0.246 0.271 0.922 0.627 0.645 0.076 0.583 0.040
Unadjusted
Mean -1.171 -1.107 -1.118 -1.202 -1.171 -1.246 -1.331 -1.154 -1.174
SD 0.046 0.033 0.038 0.054 0.037 0.082 0.094 0.041 0.063
Notes: The elements presented in the last four rows are: Na (sodium), Fe (iron), MG (magnesium) and K (potassium).
Particularly the low price elasticitiy of calories as well as the positive elasticity
of sugar might prove problematic in reaching any susbstantial changes in NC-CD,
as they indicate low efficiency of any price increase in sodas in reducing calorie and
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sugar intake as would be needed to achieve positive health outcomes.
I use the ENIGH 2014 to compare the mean cohort level consumption and unit
values for soda to those in the ENIGH 2012. The ENIGH 2014 was levied around
seven months after the introduction of the tax.
The first step consists in comparing mean prices before and after the price
increase. This is to see if there was actually a pass-throug of prices. While the
literature on this particular tax (for example, Andalon and Gibson (2017)) mentions
that there was an almost 100% pass-through rate, I want to visualize the magnitude
of the increase for different cohorts and see if there is any relationship between the
price increases and the food expenditure distribution. I achieve this by comparing
the mean prices at the cohort level, in particular by visualizing the difference in
mean values25 ( Figure 4.8). The prices reported thrughout this study are liter
prices for which the tax was 1 MXN increase. As shown in the Figure below, the
actual price increases lied well above that, with a mean price increase of just above
2 MXN per liter. It is worth mentioning that the prices reported here are not prices
from January 2014 (i.e. at the moment the tax was introduced) but that the prices
were matched to each household at the time the household was interviewed. This
might account in some part for the overproportional price increase observed.
With regards to quantity of soda consumed, the unadjusted price elasticity
predicts that an increase in the prices of 1% should lead to a decline of approximately
1% in quantity. The average price in 2012 for a liter of soda was of around 10
MXN, with an average price increase of a little over 2 MXN, the average decline in
quantity should be of around 20%, that is an average decline in the consumption
of soda with respect to 2012 of around one liter per week.
As shown in Figure 4.2 quantities consumed are the lowest at the low end of
the food expenditure distibution with approximately four liters and the highest at
the upper end of the distribution with almost 7 liters. Hence, one would expect
the decline in absolute values to be the largest at higher levels of food expenditure.
On the other hand, quality adjusted elasticities suggest a modest increase in
consumption across the board.
Figure 4.9 shows the mean difference in quantities between both years for each
cohort along the food expenditure distribution. The mean difference across cohorts
is just below −0.47 liters. This differences are not consistent with a price elasticity
of −1, but neither are they completely consistent with a quality adjusted price
elasticity. Nevertheless, a comparison of the cohort mean levels between years
yields that only eight cohorts display statistically different mean consumptions.
The differences in quantities stemming from those cohorts are indicated by a black
diamond in Figure 4.9.
25All prices have been deflated with the corresponding monthly price index and are thus
comparable.
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Figure 4.8: Price differences 2012-2014
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Notes: Differences are computed at the cohort mean. The mean difference in quantity across all
cohorts (2.273836 pesos) is depicted by the solid horizontal line. A comparison of means yields
that all differences are statistically significant. There is no statistical relationship between the
difference in prices and food expenditure (not reported.).
While there is a significant price increase, there does not appear to be a
corresponding decline in the consumption of soda. The argument put forward in
the text is that the lack of an effect of the tax on consumption is due to quality
substitituion. That is, households will move towards goods in the same commodity
group with lower quality and thus, lower unit value. Furthermore, this effect should
be more salient in those households that are able to move to lower quality items. In
the data this was the case for households at the upper end of the food expenditure
distribution.
Figure 4.10 illustrates the differences in mean unit value for each cohort along
the food expenditure distribution between 2012 and 2014. Again, statistically sig-
nificant differences between means for each cohort are indicated by black diamonds
while insignificant ones are clear circles. Moreover, the dotted line represents the
relationship between the difference in unit values and the food expenditure. This
relationship is statistically significant at the 1%.
Differences of zero or not significant differences mean that although prices per
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Figure 4.9: Quantity differences 2012 - 2014
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Notes: Differences are computed at the cohort mean. The mean difference in quantity across
all cohorts (−.4617876 liters) is depicted by the solid horizontal line. Statistically sinificant
differences are depicted by solid diamonds. Not statistically significant differencces are empty
circles. There is no statistically significant relationship between the difference in quantities and
the food expenditures (not reported.).
liter increased, on average, those cohorts are paying the same unit value as before
the tax. But for this to be the case, they have to be most likely consuming lower
quality items.
In conclusion, while prices for soda increase, there is not a corresponding decline
in the quantities consumed. The data also suggests that those at low levels of food
expenditure are unable to switch to a lower quality and bear the tax increase to a
larger extent.
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Figure 4.10: Unit value differences 2012-2014
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Notes: Differences are computed at the cohort mean. The mean difference in quantity across all
cohorts (1.149383 pesos) is depicted by the solid horizontal line. Statistically sinificant differences
are depicted by solid diamonds. Not statistically significant differencces are empty circles.
4.5 Conclusion
I estimate price elasticities of quantity for soda beverages in Mexico and differentiate
between quality adjusted and unadjusted elasticities.
I find that quality substitution in this particular commodity group is large
enough to offset any negative demand effects that could arise from a price increase,
for example a tax. Particularly individuals with high food expenditures and high
consumption of soda present a high tendency to substitute into lower quality items
in the same commodity group. Conversely, quality substitution is less likely to
occur at low food expenditure levels. A probable cause is that there is no room
for quality substitution. One indication for this claim lies in the low unit values
reported at low food expenditure levels. This would also mean that the brunt of
any taxation scheme would be born by households with low food expenditures,
which already display low levels of consumption. I show that after the tax is
introduced in 2014 prices for soda increase overproportionally but quantities do
not change as expected. Furthermore, unit values increase more strongly at lower
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levels of food expenditure. To better see the reason for this, note that the mean
price for Coca-Cola in 2014 was 15 MXN while the prices for all other types of
soda, including national brands, were just above 12 MXN26. A taxation scheme
that taxes all brands by the same amount per liter maintains this distance in prices.
Households that consumed brands with higher prices before the tax is introduced
will inevitable choose brands with relatively lower prices after the tax is introduced
and thus will not necessarily change their consumption behaviour. In a situation
were households with higher expenditures are also those with a higher consumption
of the taxed good it is unlikely that such a tax will have any significant effect on
the quantity consumed. Conversely, the tax will disproportionally fall on those
households that consume those goods that display low prices, and thus low quality,
and for which there is not a lower quality to choose. This means, that if those
households able to pay a higher unit value are simultaneously those with the highest
consumption, then the efficacy of such a tax has to be called into question.
The policy implications that can be drawn form this study point toward more
complex solutions to the high soda consumption present in many countries. Amongst
others, the existence of low quality substitutes appears to be the most problematic
in achieving a significant quantity reduction. Individuals that already consume
low quality items appear to respond more strongly to the tax, as the have less
possibilities to engage in quality substitution.
The soda tax was implemented the 1st of January 2014. A study by Colchero
et al. (2017) reports sustained decrease in soda purchases, up to 9% in 2015. In their
study, they use store purchase data for more than 6000 households. Furthermore,
they report that the largest decreases in purchases of soda were found at the
lowest socioeconomic levels. Particularly this last finding is in line with low quality
adjusted elasticities found in this study. As for the magnitude of their findings,
they argue that the large, sustained decline in soda purchases could be attributed
to an increased awareness of the negative effects of soda on health.
The main driver of the results in this study is the discrepancy between unit
values gathered from a household expenditures survey and the prices levied by
an official government source. Going forward, it would certainly be of interest to
revise changes in purchases as well as in consumption along the quality spectrum.
For example data on store purchases, in the likes of Colchero et al. (2017), could be
used to determine if there is shift in the brands consumed, especially towards those
with lower prices. Alternatively, albeit difficult, data on sales from the different
companies that offer these brands could be analysed to determined the existence of
a shift.
26The price data per item is provided by the INEGI. The mean was computed over the months
of September until November 2014. That is the same time frame during which the survey used in
this study was levied.
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This question appears to be of importance in the discussion regarding con-
sumption of goods that are easily over-consumed and for which there are a variety
of qualities available, for example alcohol. In the last months of 2017, Scotland
discussed and agreed on the implementation of a minimum price for alcohol to
decrease over-consumption.
An interesting extension would be to consider information on physical activity
and changes thereof. It is well known that the lack of physical activity plays an
important part in maintaining and increasing physical as well as mental health
(Rivera et al., 2002). In the past, Mexico has attracted attention with ingenious
campaings to increase physical activity, for example offering free metro tickets in
exchange for sit-ups.The efficacy and effectivenes of both types of both pecuaniary
and non-pecuniary strategies should be weighted against one another. Finally, it
would be interesting to consider the effect of zero sugar items as a substitute for
sugar-added ones. Although Colchero et al. (2017) report that the share of this last
beverages on total purchases is negligible, representative data on their consumption
is not readily available. Beverages without sugar or with sugar substitutes could
become a valuable alternative in the fight against NC-CD in the future.
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